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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Al-Jawary decision is justified and that the cooperation achieved
between the United States and Italy in this case reveals the importance of adhering to legal channels in the extradition of terrorists. Part I examines the history of extradition and reviews the
respective approaches to the political offense doctrine adopted by both the United States and Italy.
Part II discusses the factual and procedural background of AI-Jawary, the judgment of the Court
of Cassation, and the reasoning behind the Court’s opinion. Part III argues that AI-Jawary represents a proper interpretation of the political offense doctrine under current Italian jurisprudence
and parallels prevailing U.S. law governing application of the political offense provision to terrorist crimes. This Comment concludes that the successful extradition of Al-Jawary via the U.S.
and Italian authorities designated to handle extradition is the appropriate way for the United States
to bring international terrorists to justice. As Al-Jawary reflects, adhering to proper channels to
apprehend criminals permits the United States to strengthen continued mutual cooperation in legal
matters with its allies and encourages a uniform approach to the political offense doctrine.

COMMENT
IN RE EXTRADITION OF KHALED MOHAMMED EL
JASSEM: THE DEMISE OF THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE PROVISION IN U.S.-ITALIAN
RELATIONS*'
INTRODUCTION
The rise in international terrorism over the past decade
has led to increased efforts to combat terrorist activities. 2 Both
* The 1992 Marks & Murase International Law Fellowship generously funded
the research for this Comment with the United States Department ofJustice in Rome,
Italy. The author would like to thank Mary Ellen Warlow, Senior Counsel for
International Law Enforcement, United States Department of Justice, Criminal
Division, and Professor Marjorie A. Martin and Abraham Abramovsky of Fordham
University School of Law for their efforts on his behalf.
1. The defendant's full name is Khalid Duhhan AI-Jawary, alias Khaled
Mohammed El Jassem [hereinafter AI-Jawary]. The trial of AI-Jawary opened in
Brooklyn Federal Court in the Eastern District of New York only days following the
World Trade Center bombing on Feb. 26, 1993. Terror in the Twin Towers; Jury Panel
Sequestered in Bomb Trial, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1993, at A16. AI-Jawary was
sentenced on April 16, 1993 to serve a 30 year jail term. "Palestinian Militant
Sentenced to 30 Years in Jail," REUTERS, Apr. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, OMNI File.
2. Committee on International Terrorism of the American Branch of the International Law Association, Report on Efforts to Revise United States Legislation on Extradition
as It May Impact on Combatting InternationalTerrorism, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw:
A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 333 (Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif Bassiouni
eds., 1987) [hereinafter NANDA & BASSIOUNI]; see AntiterrorismAct of 1986: Hearings on
H.R. 4294 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1986) (setting forth statement of Hon. Ron Wyden, a Representative in
Congress from State of Oregon) [hereinafter AntiterrorismAct of 1986]. U.S. citizens,
in particular, have been signalled out as the targets of many terrorist activities. Antiterrorism Act of 1986, supra, at 18. State Department statistics reflect that since
1968, U.S. citizens have been attacked in more than 70 countries. Id. In 1985, U.S.
citizens and property alone were the targets of about twenty-five percent of all international terrorist attacks. Id. Twenty-three Americans out of a total of 139 wounded
died. Id.; see New York State Bar Association, The Creation of An InternationalCriminal
Court,

REPORT OF THE COMMERCIAL AND FEbERAL LITIGATION SECTION

10 (1991)

[hereinafter NY Bar Report]. In an effort to combat terrorism, countries have
adopted various approaches including entering into treaties or conventions by which
they agree that
(i) a particular type of conduct is violative of international law . .
(ii) each party to the convention will pass domestic or national legislation
criminalizing the conduct under each of their respective laws; and
(iii) each party will either prosecute or extradite any offender apprehended
within its borders.
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the nations targeted for terrorist attacks and those that have

become refuges for terrorists seeking to evade prosecution
have sought to strengthen international cooperation to facili-

tate apprehension of such criminals.' As a result, international
New York Bar Report, supra, at 10.
The principle of "prosecuting or extraditing" is referred to in international law
as aut judicare Rut dedere. ANTONIO CASSESE, TERRORISM, PoLITIcs AND LAw: THE
ACHILLE

LAURO AFFAIR 10 (1989).

Under this principle, "the contracting state on

whose territory the author, or alleged author, of a terrorist crime is found, must
either try him or hand him over to the other contracting party that requests his extradition according to the treaty provisions." Id.
The seven Economic Summit nations (the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Canada, France, and Great Britain) have vowed to commit themselves to "support
the rule of law in bringing terrorists to justice." Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition
and the PoliticalOffense Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767, 770 n.8
(1992). The list of multilateral conventions adopted by many of the Economic Summit Seven members to combat terrorism include the Air Piracy Conventions such as
the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention]; the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570
[hereinafter Montreal Convention]; the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Subsequent conventions include the 1973
New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; and the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
3.

RICHARD CLUTrERBUCK,

TERRORISM,

DRUGS AND CRIME IN

EUROPE AFTER

1992 26 (1990). Italy is an example of a nation besieged by terrorist activities and is
notorious for its four giant criminal networks: the Sicilian Mafia, operating a worldwide drug-trafficking network; the rival Neapolitan Mafias, Camorra and New Camorra; and the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta. Id.; see CLAIRE W. STERLING, OCTOPUS: THE
LONG REACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL SICILIAN MAFIA 45 (1990) (describing official esti-

mate that Mafia brings annual revenue approaching quarter of trillion dollars, making Mafia twentieth richest "nation" in world). "Their activities [dominate] national
politics, local government, commerce, industry, and terrorism and they themselves
apply terrorist tactics in some ways more vicious than most political terrorists."
CLUTTERBUCK, supra, at 26; see Claudio Rinaldi, Italia del Disonore: Come Vincere Questa
Guerra, L'EsPRESSO, Aug. 2, 1992, at 12 (noting brutal attack by which Italian Mafia

assassinated Italy's top Anti-Mafia Magistrates Giovanni Falcone, Paolo Borsellino
and their escorts in two separate car bomb incidents in Summer of 1992). For this
reason, "Italy has had to cope with the highest level of political terrorism outside
Northern Ireland and Spain." CLUTrERBUCK, supra, at 26.
In an effort to combat international narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and
terrorism, the United States and Italy have adopted various methods to increase cooperation between law enforcement officials in the two countries. Richard A. Martin,
Problems in InternationalLaw Enforcement, Address presented at the Fordham University
School of Law (February 28, 1991), in 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 519 (1990-1991) [hereinafter Martin Address]. One such example is the United States-Italian Working
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cooperation in law enforcement has assumed an increasingly
important role. 4 Through the institution of mutual legal assistance treaties, one country's national law enforcement authorities can exchange information with the law enforcement offi-

cials in other countries, thus expediting the apprehension of
terrorists.5

Locating a terrorist, however, is only the initial phase in
bringing one to justice. The requesting state 6 must overcome
numerous obstacles before it is granted custody over an individual found in another country.7 Extradition provides the
Group on Organized Crime and Narcotics which has been expanded to include terrorism as well. Martin Address, supra, at 521. The most significant form of cooperation, however, has been through the ratification of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Italian Republic, Nov. 9, 1982, entered into force
Nov. 13, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985).
4. Martin Address, supra note 3,at 519.
5. JOSEPH J. LAMBERT, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 248
(1990). "[S]ince 1973 the United States has entered into a series of comprehensive
bilateral treaties with other States--of both the common law and civil law systemson the subject of mutual assistance in criminal matters." Id. These treaties serve as
one of the most important means through which law enforcement officials exchange
information, permitting governments "to eliminate time-consuming methods of
gathering evidence and serving documents abroad." Robert L. Pisani & Robert
Fogelnesto, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters, in NANDA
& BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 233.
Mutual legal assistance treaties [hereinafter MLATS] replace the obscure and
time-consuming use of letters rogatory. LAMBERT, supra, at 247 n.7. Prior to the
institution of MILATS, requests from judicial authorities had to be transmitted
through various diplomatic channels. Id. These judicial requests, referred to as letters rogatory, posed numerous problems, such as a lack of specified procedures for
taking testimony evidence in a another jurisdiction or of mandatory procedures regarding authentication of another jurisdiction's documents. JOHN F. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 97 (1985). The U.S.-Italy MLAT has done away
with the cumbersome channels that had to be followed for executing requests by
designating the U.S. Attorney General and the Italian Minister of Grace and Justice
as the central authorities for processing judicial requests. U.S.-Italy MLAT, supra
note 3, art. 2, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1542. The Senior Counsel for International
Law Enforcement in Rome, Italy acts as a liaison office to coordinate judicial requests
exchanged between the Italian Ministry of Grace and Justice in Rome and the Office
of International Affairs in Washington, D.C. (Summer Internship conducted by Comment Author with Senior Counsel for International Law Enforcement, U.S. Department ofJustice, in Rome, Italy, Summer 1992).
6. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 359-60 (2d ed. 1987). "Requesting state" refers to the nation making the
extradition request and "requested state" refers to the nation receiving the request.
JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 146 (3d ed. 1988).
7. NY Bar Report, supra note 2, at 4-5. In a simple scenario where a foreign
national of Country A commits a criminal act directed in some manner against Coun-
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means by which one nation may transfer a terrorist from its

own territory to another jurisdiction.8 Extradition treaties are
bilateral agreements that create a legal framework for the extradition of criminals. 9 In 1983, the United States and Italy, in
an effort to achieve more effective cooperation in the repres-

sion of crimes, concluded a new treaty for the reciprocal extradition of criminal offenders." ° Similar to many other extradition treaties that the United States has ratified, the Extradition
Treaty between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Italy (the

"U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty") contains a broad political offense exception that prohibits the extradition of individuals
who have committed political offenses.II Because the ultimate
try B (requesting state) and is then apprehended in Country C (requested state),
numerous questions arise once the suspect is apprehended and country B requests
that the individual be extradited to country B. Id. Issues such as whether extradition
should be granted to the requesting state, or whether instead the accused should be
prosecuted in the requested state arise. Id. at 5. In addition, complications exist as
to which country's laws should apply if no extradition treaty exists between the two
countries. Id. Furthermore, if the act is politically motivated, this motivation may
serve as a defense, but it is unclear who sets the criteria for assessing political motivation. Id. Above all, even if there is a desire to prosecute, the requested state may not
be able to obtain the evidence necessary to convict the individual under its judicial
system. Id. As Murphy notes, "the problems often become increasingly complex
after apprehension." MURPHY, supra note 5, at 96. See SWEENEY, supra note 6, at 142
(noting that once individual commits offense in one state, but manages to get beyond
its borders, person is, in absence of appropriate arrangements, beyond reach of
power of state).
8. ChristopherJ. Morvillo, IndividualRights and the Doctrine of Specialty: The Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 987, 988-89 (1990-1991)
(noting that extradition represents formal diplomatic process by which one country
petitions second country to return fugitive that has been apprehended within legal
jurisdiction of latter country). "The right of foreign sovereigns to demand and obtain the extradition of an accused criminal is created by treaty, the absence of which
does not obligate a requested state to comply with an extradition request." SWEENEY,
supra note 6, at 146. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886)
(noting that prior to treaties there was no well-defined obligation of one country to
deliver fugitives to another and though such delivery was often made, it was upon
principle of comity).
9. Valerie Epps, Abolishing the Political Offence Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 203 (M. CherifBassiouni ed.,
1988) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, LEGAL RESPONSES].
10. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy,
T.I.A.S. No. 10837, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1527 (1985) [hereinafter U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty].
11. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. V, 1, 24 I.L.M. at 1528.
Article V of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty prohibits extradition for a political of-
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decision to extradite lies with the judiciary of the requested
state, domestic law and internal criminal procedure codes dictate whether a crime is extraditable.' 2 A conflict arises if the
requested state adheres to domestic principles and refuses to

extradite an individual in apparent defiance of an international
3

bilateral treaty.'
In In re Extradition of Khaled Mohammed ElJassem ("In re AlJawary" or "Al-Jawary"),' 4 the Italian Supreme Court of Cassa-

tion' 5 (the "Court" or "Court of Cassation") addressed the is-

fense without defining a political offense. Id. Article V, 1 states that "extradition
shall not be granted when the offense for which extradition is requested is a political
offense." Id.
12. GIULIO CATELANI & DANIELE STRIANI, L'EsTRADIZIONE 10-11 (1983). The author notes that
Allo stato attuale della legislazione interna italiana e della consuetudine
vigente nei rapporti internazionali l'estradizione & concepita come un atto
dello Stato di soggiorno della persona perseguita, atto per ilquale 4 sostanzialmente previsto un ampio margine di discrezionaliti delle autoritA
dello Stato cui la richiesta stata inoltrata, discrezionalit5 sottrata ad ogni
controllo giurisdizionale.
Id. at 8. (discussing how under Italian legal system extradition is recognized as act of
requested state subject to wide margin of discretion by authorities of requested state
who must nevertheless abide by legal standards) (translation synopsis by Comment
Author).
13. See SWEENEY, supra note 6, at 293-95 (discussing refusal by French court to
grant U.S. request for extradition of William Roger Holder and Mary Katherine
Kerkow, both indicted in United States in connection with 1972 airline hijacking).
Following the extradition denial, the U.S. Embassy at Paris forwarded the following
note to the Acting Legal Adviser in the French Foreign Ministry regarding the French
refusal and the applicability of the U.S.-French extradition convention in force:
In the view of the United States Government the decision of the French
Government in this case to deny extradition on the sole grounds of an alleged political motivation for the crime is inconsistent with France's obligations under the Treaty of Extradition between the United States of America
and the Republic of France.
Id. at 296.
14. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (Khaled Mohammed ElJassem), Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Pen. I/a, Sentence No. 767 [hereinafter In re Al-Jawary].
15. G.L. CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 224-26 (1985). Criminal jurisdiction in the Italian legal system is exercised by the ordinary courts known as the
Pretore, the Tribunale, and the Corte d'assise. Id. Decisions may be appealed to the
Corte d'appello, and the Corte d'assise d'appello. Id. The Court of Cassation serves
as the nation's supreme criminal court. Id. at 189. The Court of Cassation reviews
questions of law and is "charged with the duty of ensuring the exact observance and
uniform interpretation of the law ...

thereby ...

maintaining national unity in the

substantive law." Id. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the Court of Cassation is not designed to decide constitutional questions. Id. at 156. Under the Italian

legal system, "where a constitutional issue arises in the course of proceedings before
any ordinary or administrative court, the judge remits the issue to the Constitutional
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sue of whether Khaled Mohammed ElJassem ("Al-Jawary"), an
Iraqi terrorist accused of placing three bombs in New York
City in 1973 and subsequently arrested in Rome in 1991, could
be extradited to the United States.1 6 The Court of Cassation
delivered a judgment that challenges the traditional Italian
view of what constitutes a political offense. 1 7 In AI-Jawary, the

Court of Cassation held that in accordance with the prevailing
tendency in international law to diffuse the political offense

doctrine, Al-Jawary's crime did not constitute a political offense.1 " The Court reached this conclusion despite provisions
in Italian Penal Law and the Italian Constitution that appear to
place Al-Jawary's act under the guise of the political offense

exception.' 9 Thus, rather than upholding Italian domestic law
and the traditional approach to the political offense doctrine,
the Court of Cassation applied a new interpretation of political
offenses in view of prevailing international legislation. °
This Comment argues that the Al-Jawary decision is justified and that the cooperation achieved between the United
States and Italy in this case reveals the importance of adhering
to legal channels in the extradition of terrorists. Part I examCourt and suspends the original proceedings pending the resolution of the issue."
Id. As a condition for the submission of the issue to the Constitutional Court, however, "the original court must be satisfied that the resolution of the issue is significant
to the resolution of the original proceedings and that the issue is not manifestly unfounded." Id. The exception explains why the Court of Cassation often engages in
deciding constitutional issues because the Court frequently finds "legitimate constitutional issues to be patently groundless, thereby foreclosing their consideration by
the Constitutional Court." MARIO CAPPELLETrI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
AN INTRODUCTION 77-78 (1967).
16. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez.
Penale I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 1.
17. Id. at 14-18.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 15-16. The Court of Cassation noted that "[All fini estradizionali, occorre muovere... dall'evoluzione della normativa internazionale (trattati bilaterali e
convenzioni plurilaterali) in materia." Id. [With regards to extradition, it is necessary to proceed . .. with [an analysis of] the evolution of international norms [bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions] on the subject (translated by Comment
Author). The relevant treaties that the Court is referring to include the Montreal
Convention, supra note 2, the Air Piracy Conventions, supra note 2, and the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, E.T.S. 90, reprintedin 15
I.L.M. 1272 (1976), and JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 534 (3d ed. Supp. 1988)
[hereinafter Sweeney Supplement].
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ines the history of extradition and reviews the respective approaches to the political offense doctrine adopted by both the
United States and Italy. Part II discusses the factual and procedural background of AI-Jawary, the judgment of the Court of
Cassation, and the reasoning behind the Court's opinion. Part
III argues that AI-Jawary represents a proper interpretation of
the political offense doctrine under current Italian jurisprudence and parallels prevailing U.S. law governing application
of the political offense provision to terrorist crimes. This
Comment concludes that the successful extradition of Al-Jawary via the U.S. and Italian authorities designated to handle
extradition is the appropriate way for the United States to
bring international terrorists to justice. As Al-Jawary reflects,
adhering to proper channels to apprehend criminals permits
the United States to strengthen continued mutual cooperation
in legal matters with its allies and encourages a uniform approach to the political offense doctrine.
I. THE ORIGINS OF EXTRADITION AND THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE DOCTRINE
Extradition is an instrument of international cooperation
whereby an individual charged with a crime against the law of
one state but found in another is returned by the latter state to
the former in order to stand trial. 2 ' Nations enter into bilateral
agreements, such as an extradition treaty, to achieve more effective cooperation in various matters, including facilitating
the transfer of terrorists from one country to another.22 Such
a transfer, however, is subject to exceptions such as the political offense doctrine and is dictated by the laws of the re21. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) (defining extradition as surrender by one nation [requested state] to another [requesting state] of individual accused or convicted of offense outside of its own territory, and within territorial jurisdiction of other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands surrender);
CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 19, 28.
22. Aftermath of the Achile Lauro Incident: Hearing and Markup on H. Con. Res. 228
Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomm. on International Operations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1985) (statement of Hon. Robert Oakley, Director, Office for
Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, Department of State) [hereinafter
Achille Lauro Hearings]. As Judge Sofaer notes, parties to an extradition treaty are
more willing to share information with one another because "it is both easier and
more effective to develop ... relationships on a one-on-one basis as they are not so
likely to be complicated-by the various foreign policy and other concerns which multilateral fora generate." Id. at 18.
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quested state. 3 Courts thus apply national conceptions and
adhere to domestic laws when dealing with treaty provisions. 4
This adherence, however, may create various problems because the laws of one nation are often incompatible with the
criminal justice system of another. 5 Varying interpretations of
an extradition treaty provision, such as the political offense exception, frequently emerge and often prevent the two signato-

ries to a bilateral agreement from achieving a uniform approach to an extradition treaty provision.2 6 Pursuing legal
channels can become tedious and in an effort to avoid the inconveniences, a government may choose to bypass legal channels and engage in illicit means to apprehend terrorists.2 7
23. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 44. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 399 (1975) [hereinafter BASSIoUNI," INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM]. "[T]he courts of the requested state unavoidably apply national conceptions." Id.; see also CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 10-11. "Lo Stato di
rifugio pone limiti all'estradizione, non propriamente per proteggere la persona del
delinquente, bensi per tutelare la propria sovraniti." Id. [The requested state sets
limitations on extradition not necessarily to protect the criminal, but to safeguard its
own sovereignty] (translation by Comment Author).
24. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 10-11.
25. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 97. The laws of one nation, particularly a common
law country, may vary considerably with those following the civil code. Id. The dif-

ference is particularly evident between the United States and Italy. See Memorandum
Del Dipartimento Di Giustizia Degli Stati Uniti Sulla Documentazione A Corredo Delle Domande
Di Estradizione, in L'ESTRADIZIONE E L'ASSISTENZA GIUDIZIARIA NEI RAPPORTI ITALIASTATI UNrrI D'AMERICA 107 (Giuliano Turone ed., 1986) [hereinafter TURONE] (noting that there are substantial differences between two nations'judicial systems). As a
consequence, there may be formidable difficulties in both obtaining evidence and
exchanging information between the two countries. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 97.
Civil law countries also may be sensitive to the intrusion of foreign evidence- gathering agencies, thus inhibiting efforts to conduct proper investigations that will lead to
the successful prosecution of terrorists. Id. But see U.S. to Probe Mafia Foe's Murder,
CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1992, at CI (noting statement by U.S. Embassy spokesman Tom

Skipper in Rome, Italy that FBI agents were being sent to investigate assassination of
Judge Giovanni Falcone); Rone Tempest, No Respect for Sicily 's Godfathers, L.A. TIMES,

July 25, 1992, at AI (describing how team of FBI explosives experts operating under
supervision of Italian magistrate were in Palermo to assist Italian authorities with
investigation ofJudge Paolo Borsellino's assassination following brutal bomb attack
on magistrate and his escorts); see also Against the Mafia, WASH. POST, August 6, 1992,
at A24 (discussing how in rare form of cooperation between Italian and U.S. law
enforcement authorities multi-defendant drug conspiracy trial was recessed in Sicily
and moved to Washington, D.C. for two weeks in order to protect U.S. witnesses).
26. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 10-11.
27. SWEENEY, supra note 6, at 142. Once an individual who has committed a
criminal act no longer lies within the state's jurisdiction, a state, "powerful as it may
be as the sole legitimate depositary of power in its territory, is now helpless." Id. In
order to apprehend the individual, states "highly dedicated to the rule of law [will, at
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A. Extradition, Its Role in Combatting Terrorism and the Political
Offense Doctrine: An HistoricalAnalysis
Extradition itself represents one of the oldest instruments

of cooperation between states in criminal matters. 2 ' Historically, extradition was utilized by monarchs to seek the return of
individuals accused of committing crimes against the state.2 9
Since then, extradition has evolved through bilateral and mul-

tilateral conventions to incorporate a myriad of crimes.

°

Though the use of extradition has increased in scope, it has

generally retained its original purpose, the surrender by one
nation to another of individuals accused or convicted of committing an offense within the jurisdiction of the requesting
state.3 '
Extradition treaties provide a more directed approach toward apprehending terrorists than multilateral agreements.3 2
times] ...

-

under the latin motto male captus, bene detenum

-

[sponsor] kidnap-

ping and other illegal practices to return the offender for prosecution. Id.; see generally Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy
Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991) [hereinafter Abramovsky, Catch and Snatch
Policy] (describing how U.S. government has pursued official policy of securing jurisdiction through extraterritorial abductions); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (holding that U.S. government may kidnap people outside
U.S. borders to stand trial within United States even if United States has extradition
treaty in force with that nation).
28. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 21. The origins of extradition can be
traced as far back as 1280 B.C., prior to the institution of the Roman precept ius
gentium. Id. The first recorded extradition treaty involved a peace treaty between
Ramses II, Pharaoh of Egypt, and the Hittite King Hattusili III. Gregory Chadwick
Perry, Comment, The Four Major Western Approaches to the Political Offense Exception to
Extradition: From Inception to Modern Terrorism, 40 MERCER L. REV. 709, 714 (1989).
The treaty provided for the mutual return of criminals who had fled and sought refuge in the other leader's territory. Id.
29. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 46. Such crimes included treason, attempts to assassinate the monarch, and other politically inspired crimes. Perry, supra note 28, at
714.
30. Achille Lauro'Hearings, supra note 22, at 20-21; Theo Vogler, Perspectives on
Extradition and Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 391 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1975); see supra note 2 and accompanying text (listing multilateral conventions and crimes that they incorporate).
31. Petersen, supra note 2, at 771.
32. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing how parties to extradition treaty are more inclined to share information when acting directly). Although
the bilateral and multilateral approach to extradition create a legal framework for
combatting terrorism, states rarely utilize multilateral conventions to extradite individuals guilty of terrorist crimes. Vogler, supra note 30, at 391. One reason is because no specific definition of international terrorism exists. Id. As Frank H. Perez,
Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Combatting Terrorism, testified
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Bilateral extradition treaties can effectively combat terrorism
due to the nature of the agreement accepted by both parties."
Parties enter into a bilateral extradition treaty to achieve a mu-

tual interest. 34 The negotiation of a binding instrument is inin In re Mackin, 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), "[O]ne man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter." Id.; see MURPHY, supra note 5, at 42-43 (stating that although
there are number of multilateral extradition arrangements, most extradition takes
place in accordance with terms of bilateral extradition treaties). The absence of a
standard definition of terrorism led nations to revert to listing crimes in extradition
treaties. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 43. These treaty lists, however, become quickly
out-dated as new crimes are discovered and defined. Id. In an effort to overcome
this problem and thus bypass continued amendments to treaties once new crimes
developed, the United States has abandoned the list approach and replaced it with a
coverage of crimes of a certain level of severity. Id. at 43; see, e.g., Extradition Treaty
with Italy, S. REP. No. 98-33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) [hereinafter Treaty Analysis] (describing how U.S.-Italy Treaty, similar to other recently negotiated treaties by
United States, dispenses with traditional list of offenses and adopts prevailing modem international practice of permitting extradition for any crime punishable under
laws of both countries).
States also rarely utilize multilateral conventions to extradite individuals because
absent an extradition treaty applicable to the country in question, no rule of customary international law obligates the requested country to return an alleged offender to
the requesting state. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 36. To avoid complications, the
United States has signed over 104 extradition treaties to govern extradition for specific offenses. Abramovsky, Catch and Snatch Policy, supra note 27, at 154. Under
U.S. jurisprudence, extradition is only permissible by treaty and is controlled by 18
U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, 3186. NANDA & BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 344.
Because states are not obliged to return fugitives to the requesting state, the
effectiveness of multilateral conventions is limited by the willingness of states to enforce them. See Achille Lauro Hearings, supra note 22, at 22. Hon. Robert Oakley
emphasized that the United States has looked to the Summit Seven industrial states
for closer cooperative measures against terrorism, but the results have been mixed.
Id at 20. Attaining effective cooperation "even among [such] a small group of likeminded nations" is not easy because each state faces a different terrorist problem,
has its own foreign or economic priorities, and acts to satisfy its own interests. Id. at
21.
33. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing how parties to extradition treaties are more inclined to share information in bilateral arrangement). Id.; see
CATELAN1 & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 203 (noting that "l'istituto dell'estradizione si
basa sull'esigenza di una collaborazione internazionale per combattere le manifestazioni criminose pit gravi; tale collaborazione ovviamente presuppone una mutua
fiducia nel corretto svolgimento dell'attivit6 giudiziarie.") Id. [the institution of extradition is based on the need for international cooperation to combat serious criminal manifestations; this cooperation clearly presupposes that each nation will faithfully execute its judicial activities] (translation by Comment Author).
34. Treaty Analysis, supra note 32, at 1 (noting how U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty
is intended to facilitate U.S.-Italian efforts to prosecute narcotics conspiracies by expressly providing that conspiracies and attempts to commit extraditable offenses constitute extraditable offenses); see CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 10- 11 (discussing need for extradition to combat international crime).
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dicative of a willingness to cooperate to further that interest.3 5

Because of varying interpretations of treaty provisions applied
by nations, however, obtaining a country's ratification of a bilateral extradition treaty does not guarantee that country's ad-

herence to such a treaty.36
In recent years, the political offense exception has posed a
significant obstacle for nations to obtain the successful extradition of terrorists despite extradition agreements negotiated to

facilitate the apprehension of terrorists.3 7 The nineteenth century doctrine permits offenders who have committed a "political offense' '38 to invoke an exception to the extradition re35. TURONE, supra note 25, at 149 (noting how need to conduct effective fight
against international trafficking of drugs and desire to strengthen procedural cooperation formed basis of new U.S.-Italy Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty).
36. Achille Lauro Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (setting forth statement of Hon.
Robert B. Oakley). One well-known incident that attracted worldwide attention was
the Achille Lauro affair in which Palestinian terrorists seized an Italian cruise ship,
the Achile Lauro, and subsequently killed one U.S. citizen confined to a wheel chair.
Martin Address, supra note 3, at 531-534. In a flawless military operation conducted
days after the incident, U.S. military fighters intercepted an Egyptian airliner on
which Abu Abbas and several of the terrorists were found. Id. The plane was forced
to land at the Sigonella NATO base in Sicily. Id. The United States, strictly adhering
to the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, immediately requested Abu Abbas' provisional
arrest pursuant to provisions set forth in the bilateral treaty. Id. The Italian Justice
Minister did not feel that the evidence submitted satisfied factual and substantive
requirements mandated by Italian law and subsequently denied the request only six
hours after its presentation despite what appeared to be sufficient evidence to support it. Id. at 533. The terrorists were later released but ultimately prosecuted in
Italy in absentia. Id. As one commentator reflected on the whole affair, "the United
States was right in accusing Italy of violating the 1983 treaty." CASSESE, supra note 2,
at 97.
37. Achille Lauro Hearings, supra note 22, at 68; BAssIouNI, LEGAL RESPONSES,
supra note 9, at 202; Martin Address, supra note 3, at 529.
38. LAMBERT, supra note 5, at 193. "[T]he term 'political offense' has not been
defined by the international community ...[and] is probably undefinable." MURPHY,
supra note 5, at 45. The problem posed by the political offense exception when it is
applied to terrorist acts is that these offenses are generally committed in a political
context. Id. "In the broadest sense, it may be argued that all crimes are political
crimes inasmuch as all prohibitions with penal sanctions represent the defense of a
given value system ... in which the prevailing social power believes." STEPHEN SCHAFER, THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL 19 (1974). Generally, extradition treaties provide that
extradition will not be granted when "the offense for which extradition is requested
is a political offense or when it appears that the request for extradition is made with a
view to prosecuting, trying or punishing the person sought for a political offense."
MURPHY, supra note 5, at 44-45. Applying this definition strictly would virtually elevate all terrorist acts to political offenses, exempt terrorists from extradition, and
thus grant such offenders immunity from acts that normally would be subject to criminal prosecution (e.g. murder, assault, kidnapping). Id.
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quirement. 39 The doctrine has developed differently in many
nations, due in part to divergent notions of the scope of the
political offense exception.4 0 The varying interpretations applied by the judicial authorities of both civil and common law

countries have prevented the development of a uniform inter-

pretation of this doctrine. 4 The political offense exception
thus poses one of the most problematic issues in extraditing
terrorists. 42
The political offense exception is a standard clause in extradition treaties, 43 thus illustrating the significant recognition

it has attained in the international community throughout the
course of its historical development. 44 Historically, extradition
served as a vehicle for states to apprehend persons who had
committed acts directed against the sovereign and subsequently fled the state to avoid prosecution. 45 The rise of political theories on freedom and democracy,4 6 coupled with the
spirited revolutionary movements of the early nineteenth century, reversed the traditional hostile attitude towards political
offenders.4 7 Democratic governments romantically glorified
political offenders, 4 no longer considering them criminals, but
noble revolutionaries fighting for democracy against repressive
regimes.4 9 In the 1830s, France and Belgium devised the first
39. BASSIOUNI, LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 37, at 203.
40. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 47. "In practice, states have defined the term
'political offense' unilaterally, usually through their judiciaries." Id. As a consequence, "the courts of the requested state unavoidably apply national conceptions,
standards and policies ....
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 23, at
399. The result has been that despite the doctrine's universality, no single definition
exists. Id.

41.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note

23, at 399.

42. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 44.

43.
44.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 23, at 399.
SWEENEY, supra note 6, at 148.
45. DR. CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO

EXTRADITION 5 (1980). "In general, sovereigns were totally indifferent towards persons [who had committed common crimes and] who had fled the country ....
For
crimes against the state, however, the situation was completely different since sovereigns had a direct interest in the suppression of such crimes .
I..."
Id.
46. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 23, at 400.
47. Waldemar A. Soilf, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 60 (1983); MURPHY, supra note 5, at
46-47; see BARTON L. INGRAHAM, POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE 245 (1979) (discussing
lenient and honorable forms of imprisonment invented for political offenders in addition to legal rights they were guaranteed).
48. WIJNGAERT, supra note 45, at 14.
49. Extradition Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
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political offense exception provision forbidding the extradition
of all political offenders. 5 ° The drafters, however, failed to recognize the implications of formulating such a broad definition, 5 and subsequent events both in Europe and the United
States made it clear that the drafters needed to restrict the definition.52
A series of worldwide exceptions to the political offense
doctrine emerged. 53 One of these exceptions consisted of the
Belgian attentat clause, a provision designed to deny protection
to political offenders charged with attempting to assassinate
the leader of a foreign government or a member of the leader's
family.54 Despite such exceptions to the political offense proviary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1981) [hereinafter Extradition Hearing] (Statement of
Prof. Christopher H. Pyle). Liberal statesmen from Belgium and France sought to
protect revolutionaries like Kossuth, Massini, and Garibaldi from the reactionary regimes of Austria-Hungary and Naples. Id.
50. Extradition Hearing, supra note 49, at 97. In 1829, Naples requested the
extradition of Mr. Galotti, a Neapolitan officer who had participated in the Revolution of 1820 and fled to France as soon as the Bourbons returned to power. WIJNGAERT, supra note 45, at 11. France granted the extradition on the condition Mr.
Galotti would not be prosecuted for a political offense. Id. Contrary to the agreement, the Neapolitans sentenced Mr. Galotti to death for his participation in the
Revolution. Id. The French government sent warships to Naples and was prepared
to declare war when the Neapolitans finally decided not to execute Mr. Galotti. Id.
French public opinion had been so deeply provoked by the incident that soon after
the incident the French Government declared that the extradition of political offenders would no longer be requested or granted. Id. at 12. The Belgian government
was the first country to codify the political offense exception via the Belgian Extradition Act of 1883. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 47.
51. Extradition Hearing, supra note 49, at 97; see MURPHY, supra note 5, at 47
(discussing how those supporting romantic glorification of political offenders failed
to "realize that the political offender might eventually attack the new liberal legal
order itself").
52. WIJNGAERT, supra note 45, at 14. In the second half of the 19th century,
anarchists, nihilists, and terrorists began to attack liberal democracies. Id. "Between
1854 and 1911 nineteen heads of state died at the hands of assassins, including Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley of the United States .... Czar Alexander II of
Russia, . . . Empress Elizabeth of Austria, King Humbert of Italy, and President
Carnot of France." Extradition Hearing, supra note 49, at 97-98.
53. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 23, at 435. Additional exceptions denied protection to anarchists, as well as persons charged with war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. Id. Other exceptions also developed to permit the return of individuals from one country to another that had been charged with
crimes against diplomats, or had committed acts of piracy, hijacking, and/or slavery.
Extradition Hearing, supra note 49, at 98.
54. Extradition Hearing, supra note 49, at 98. The attentat clause evolved as a
result of theJacquin case in which two Frenchman residing in Belgium were unsuccessful in their attempt to assassinate French Emperor Napoleon III by placing a
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sion, the political offense doctrine continued to evolve while its
fundamental premise, the protection of political dissidents
fleeing from despotic regimes, remained unchanged.55
In the twentieth century, changing ideologies reinforced
the need for the political offense exception as nations were
confronted with an influx of people who could not return to

their country of origin for fear of religious, social, ethnic, or
political persecution. 56 The lack of a uniform definition to address changing criminal trends, however, has created a significant obstacle for extraditing terrorists who allege that their
acts are protected by the political offense exception.
Both

domestic laws and bilateral extradition treaties continue to incorporate the doctrine and various interpretations of the exbomb on the railway where the Emperor's train was about to pass. See WIJNGAERT,
supra note 45, at 14 n.73. The French government requested Jacquin's extradition,
but the Belgian Court of Appeals held that the crimes charged were political offenses.
Id. at 14-15. The Belgian government faced a difficult situation. Id. at 15. Denying
the request could lead to retaliation by the militarily superior French, while ignoring
the court's decision was not politically desirable. Id. The French government chose
to withdraw the request, ultimately resolving the issue, but urged the Belgian government to pass a law to prevent similar judicial interpretations of the political offense
exception in the future. Id. Thus evolved the Belgian attentat clause. Id.
55. WIJNGAERT, supra note 45, at 18-19. Additional justifications have been
cited for the political offense exception. SWEENEY, supra note 6, at 148. The first
justification, consistent with the modern consensus that political crimes have greater
legitimacy than common crimes, focuses on the right to resort to political activism to
foster political change. Id. The second justification relates to sovereignty and the
notion that governments should not intervene in the internal political struggles of
other nations. Id.
56. WUNGAERT, supra note 45, at 17-20. Following World War I and II, nations
were confronted with an influx of people who "could or would not return to their
country of origin for fear of religious, ethnic, racial, social, political or other persecution." Id. at 17. As a result, "the twentieth century . . . witnessed a tendency to
widen the scope of the political offence exception [to protect these individuals from
being returned to their countries to face oppression]." Id. The doctrine, however,
has been expanded so greatly that "persons who reject democracy can equally enjoy
the protection of the political offence exception together with the criminal immunity
resulting therefrom." Id. at 20; see Miriam E. Sapiro, Note, Extradition in an Era of
Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654, 656
(1986) (discussing how political offense exception "was created to protect individuals
from unjust persecution for political beliefs, but can be used by perpetrators of common crimes with political overtones to avoid extradition"). The political offense exception thus becomes detrimental to international public order because "it offers
shelter and immunity from criminal liability to persons who may have committed very
serious offences." Id. at 657.
57. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing how lack of uniform
definition has permitted terrorists to utilize political offense exception to escape
prosecution).
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ception exist. 58 As a consequence, courts have applied the ex-

ception to situations inconsistent with the doctrine's purpose. 59 International efforts to combat terrorism have been
hampered by this inconsistent application, particularly in situations where a bilateral extradition treaty contains a political offense exception, but the respective signatories adopt unilateral
approaches and apply divergent domestic laws to the political
offense question.60
B. History of the PoliticalOffense Exception in U.S. Jurisprudence
Extradition in the United States is principally based on
treaties. 6' The executive, legislative and judicial branches of
the federal government, however, all play a role in the extradition process. 62 The Senate gives its advice and consent to treaties negotiated by the executive, 63 while the judiciary is empowered to interpret and apply treaty provisions. 64 This
framework allows U.S. courts to be instrumental in shaping the
definition of treaty provisions such as the political offense doctrine.65
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing how states will apply
unilateral interpretations of political offense doctrine based on national conceptions,
ultimately preventing any uniform definition to develop). For a discussion of the
various interpretations that have emerged in determining what elements constitute a
political offense see Perry, supra note 28, at 718-30 (highlighting Swiss "predominance test," French "objective test," and Anglo-American "incidence test").
59. Martin Address, supra note 3, at 529; see NANDA & BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at
335 (discussing how courts have applied 19th century concepts to 20th century reality).
60. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing U.S. refusal to
grant extradition request by United Kingdom for member of Irish Republican Army
accused of attacking convoy of British soldiers in Northern Ireland); In re Mackin, No.
80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying extradition request by U.K. for member of
IRA accused of murdering British soldier in Northern Ireland); In re McMullen, No.
3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. 1979) (discussing U.S. denial of U.K. extradition request
for member of IRA accused of murdering British soldier outside of Northern Ireland); see Epps, supra note 9, at 203 (discussing how decisions rendered in these cases
strained relations between United States and United Kingdom and resulted in formulation of U.S.-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty which virtually
eliminates use of political offense exception for acts committed by IRA).
61. M. CHERIF BASSlOUNI,
AND PRACTICE 39 (1987).

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
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In the United States, the principle underlying the political
offense exception is embodied in the ideal that inspired the
American Revolution.6 6 The right to resort to political action

to foster political change is a cornerstone of democratic governments. 6 7 Such a broad right, however, is not absolute. 68 A
series of exceptions designed to limit the broad scope of political offenses exist in the international community.6 9 In the
United States, similar to other fundamental rights in U.S. his70
tory that have been limited to protect the public interest,
U.S. courts have attempted to narrow application of the polit66. Sapiro, supra note 56, at 661 n.44. As the words of the Declaration of Independence provide
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles,
and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
67. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
2 (U.S. 1776); see, e.g., Doherty, 599 F.
Supp. at 270, 275 n.4.
68. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (explaining that political offense doctrine developed to assist liberal revolutionaries in their struggles against
despotic and totalitarian regimes, but broad definition failed to take into account that
"anarchists and terrorists" would strike democratic states via assassinations and attacks on innocent civilians).
69. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing formulation of Belgian
attentat clause). The limits to be placed on the political offense doctrine have been
the center of controversy in Congressional debates. See Antiterrorism Act of 1986,
supra note 2, at 26 (reporting statements by Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, regarding problems
presented by political offense provision of Antiterrorism Act). The lack of a uniform
definition of the political offense will continue to stir debates over whether an act is
political or criminal, but as Ms. Toensing noted, "where there are stable democracies, we cannot permit terrorists to use bullets or bombs in lieu of the ballot box [to
foster political change]." Id. at 27; see BAssIouNI, LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 9, at
184 (discussing statement by Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser to Department of
State, defining a terrorist as anyone who violently attacks "stable democracies in
which the political process is available to redress legitimate grievances and in which
the judicial system provides fair treatment").
70. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes, in deriving a
clear and present danger standard to free speech, echoed the famous words, "the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theatre, and causing a panic." Id. at 52.
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ical offense exception in order to address increased interna71
tional terrorist activity.
In an effort to facilitate application of restrictions on the
political offense doctrine, U.S. courts have distinguished two
categories of political offenses.7 2 The first category, the

"pure" political offense, refers to acts directed against the gov71. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986) (disclosing that political offense exception is not applicable to murder, bombings, and attempted bombings carried out in England by member of Irish Republican
Army (IRA) when political violence has been exported from zone of conflict in
Northern Ireland); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
894, (1981) (holding that "indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a protected political act" following assertion by Abu Eain, a member of
the PLO, that bomb he set in market place in Tiberias, Israel, killing two boys and
injuring numerous others, was political act); In re Saravia, Case No. 87-3598-CIV
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (concluding that political offense exception is not applicable to murder of priest by Salvadoran right-wing "death squad" for purposes of silencing his
opposition to violence and support for peaceful political and social reform), reprinted
in MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING THE
REQUEST FOR THE EXTRADITION OF KHALID DUHHAN AL-JAWARY 9-10, November 26,

1991 [hereinafter U.S. Memo]; In re Suarez Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal.
1988), (holding that political offense exception is not applicable to murders committed by member of Argentine military as part of "dirty war" to suppress suspected
subversives); In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (noting that political offense exception is not applicable to systematic murder of unarmed civilians and
prisoners by official of Yugoslav fascist regime during World war II); Artukovic v.
Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (D. Cal. 1956), aff'd 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated 355
U.S. 393 (1958). But see In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying
extradition request by United Kingdom (U.K.) for member of IRA accused of attacking convoy of British soldiers in Northern Ireland); In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (denying extradition
request by United Kingdom for member of IRA accused of murdering British soldier
in Northern Ireland); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959) (denying
Cuban request for extradition of member of Castro's armed forces who allegedly
shot prisoner escaping from garage in Cuba in which soldiers and associates of deposed Batista government were held). In each of these cases, U.S. courts, in assessing whether common crimes marked by serious violence should be elevated to political offense status, applied the political offense doctrine whenever "the victims were
in effect involved in the political conflict at issue and the crimes were committed in
the zone of that conflict." U.S. Memo, supra, at 10 n.8. In re McMullen, No. 3-781099 MG (N.D. Cal. 1979), is an exception. Id. In McMullen, the court denied extradition for the murder of a British soldier committed by a member of the IRA outside
of Northern Ireland. Id.
The decisions have stirred a great deal of public controversy and reflect the
difficulties encountered by the courts when limiting the political offense exception.
See Epps, supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing how public controversy
resulted in formulation of new treaty with United Kingdom).
72. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 7; Charles L. Cantrell, Note, The PoliticalOffense
Exemption in InternationalExtradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and
the Republic of Ireland, 60 MAR(. L. REV. 777, 780 (1977).
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ernment and includes offenses such as treason, sedition, and
espionage. 7 3 The second category, the "relative" political offense, includes all other common crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and assault.7 4

In order to assess whether a common crime constitutes a

"relative" political offense, U.S. courts must first apply the

political incidence test and examine whether the accused committed the act in the course of a severe, violent political conflict. 75 The political incidence test preserves the original purpose of the political offense doctrine by seeking to protect individuals from forced return to oppressive
regimes that they
76
may have spoken and/or acted against.
If the court finds that the political incidence test is satisfied, the accused must demonstrate a rational nexus between
the alleged crimes and the prevailing turmoil in the state.7 7
73. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986); Eain, 641 F.2d at
512; U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 7; Cantrell, supra note 72, at 780.
74. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 776; Eain, 641 F.2d at 512; U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at
7.
75. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 7. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d
1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980) (defining political offense as "an offense committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political
disturbance, such as war, revolution and rebellion"). The "political incidence" test,
as this approach is known, developed in the English case of In re Castioni, 1891 1
Q B. 149, [1886-90] All E.R. 640, and has formed the basis for U.S. case law concerning extradition and the political offense exception. Scott C. Barr, The Dilemma of
the Political Offense Exception: To Which Acts Should it Apply? 10 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. &
POL'Y 141, 144 (1989). In Castioni, the Swiss government requested that England
extradite a Swiss citizen accused of killing a Swiss government official during the
course of a protest sparked by the Swiss government's refusal to revise the Swiss
Constitution. Castioni, 1891 1 Q.B. at 149. The English Court of Common Pleas
denied extradition on the grounds that "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered
for extradition crimes if those crimes were 'incidental to' and formed part of the
political disturbances." Id. For a discussion of how the political incidence test was
incorporated in U.S. law see In re Ezeta 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894) and Ornelas v.
Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896). Recent decisions such as In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), and Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981), have limited the political incidence test on the basis that "[it] is
hardly consistent with.., the realities of the modern world." Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at
274. The Doherty court, similar to the Eain court, "has concluded that the traditional
incidence test is insufficient to determine which offenses are protected by the exception." Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 270. Both courts advanced a totality of the circumstances approach, comparable to the Swiss ends-means or proportionality test, to
assess the political nature of common crimes. Id.
76. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 7 n.6; see supra note 56 and accompanying text
(discussing original purpose of political offense doctrine).
77. See, e.g., In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1986). The U.S.
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U.S. courts utilize a totality of the circumstances approach
when assessing the relationship between the individual's
78
crimes and the outcome the individual sought to achieve.

Courts scrutinize the totality of the circumstances to discern an
individual's motivation and to evaluate the nature of the act,
the context in which it was committed, and the status of the
party committing the act. 79 Assessing these factors insures
that the courts do not make decisions solely based on the political situations in other countries, a role exclusively designed
for the Executive or Department of State. ° Courts in the

United States are not designed to evaluate whether the internal
strife in a nation other than the United States constitutes civil

8
war, political turmoil, or merely an act of civilian discontent. 1

The totality of the circumstances test*also is intended to pre-

vent crimes aimed at innocent civilians from acquiring protection under the political offense doctrine. 2 In the absence of
either a political conflict or a rational nexus, the courts will

refuse to elevate a common crime to relative political offense
status.83
government has defined a rational nexus as a "direct, substantial and rational connection between the offense itself and that conflict." U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 7.
78. Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. at 1376. The court noted that in searching for a
rational nexus, "the focus of inquiry is on the circumstances, and on the status of
those harmed, and not on whether the acts merely were committed during the disorder." Id. U.S. courts, in determining whether a common crime should be considered
a political offense, have utilized a totality of the circumstances approach enunciated
in Artukovic many times before. See, e.g., Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 511 (1896)
(re-affirming decision reached by hearing magistrate that political offense exception
was not applicable "in view of the character of the foray, the mode of attack, [and] the
persons"); Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275 (noting that "the court must assess the nature
of the act, the context in which it is committed; the status of the party committing the
act, the nature of the organization on whose behalf it is committed and the particularized circumstances of ... where the act takes place").
79. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275.
80. Sapiro, supra note 56, at 663-64; see Lloyd W. Grooms and Jane M. Samson,
The PoliticalOffense Exception to Extradition: A 19th Century British Standardin 20th Century
American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1984) (noting how, on international level, political offense cases affect government's foreign relations, particularly
in situations where requesting country may see extradition denial as endorsement by
requested state of accused's actions).
81. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
82. Id. In Eain, the court held that the "indiscriminate bombing of a civilian
populace is not recognized as a protected political act." Id. at 521.
83. See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affid, 619 F.2d
167 (2d Cir. 1980). Italy requested Michele Sindona's extradition from the United
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An individual's political motive for committing an act is a
common element adopted in political offense provisions of
civil law nations such as France and Italy."4 This factor alone,
however, is not determinative in U.S. jurisprudence. 8 5 The objective approach adopted by the United States differs greatly
from the subjective analysis that many civil law countries apply
when deciding political offense cases.8 6 A discrepancy thus

arises when the United States and a civil law nation enter into a
bilateral extradition treaty incorporating the political offense
provision, but each nation confronts the political offense issue
differently.
States for fraudulent bankruptcy. Id. Sindona claimed his acts were political because

they "resulted from political maneuverings" and were "pursued. for political reasons." Sindona, 619 F.2d at 173. The court rejected any analysis of the political nature of the crime because there was "no showing that there was a violent political
disturbance in Italy as to which it could relate." Id.
84. Codice Penale, art. 8, reprinted in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
23 (Edward M. Wise trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOREIGN

CODES: ITALIAN PENAL CODE

PENAL CODES]. Article 8 of the Italian Penal code provides that a common crime,
inspired in whole or in part, by political motives shall be deemed a political offense.
Id.; see Michael R. Littenburg, The Political Offense Exception: An HistoricalAnalysis and
Model for the Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1195, 1201-02 (1990) (observing that under
French law "fugitive's motivation is now a factor in determining whether a crime
constitutes offense of 'political character' ").
85. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 9 (stating that under U.S. jurisprudence, "it is a
clear and consistent principle ... that political motivation alone cannot transform a
common crime into a non-extraditable 'political' offense"); see, e.g., Eain, 641 F.2d at
520 (discussing that "for purposes of extradition, motivation is not itself determinative of political character of any given act"); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d
1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that "an offense is not of a political character
simply because it was politically motivated"); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (confirming that "[n]ot every act committed for a political purpose
or during a political disturbance may or should properly be regarded as a political
offense"). Thus,
even where a political purpose or motivation may be apparent, if consideration of other circumstances such as the gravity of the offense, the status of
the victims, and the place in which the offense is committed indicates that
the asserted connection between that political purpose and the offense is
attenuated or disproportionate to the gravity of the crime, the political offense doctrine will not apply.
U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 9; see supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing
various cases when political offense exception was refuted despite assertion by individuals that acts were politically motivated).
86. Martin Address, supra note 3, at 528 (discussing how France has been notorious for denying many extradition requests made by Italian government for return of
Red Brigade members accused of committing terrorist attacks in Italy).
87. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. V, 24 I.L.M. at 1528. Article
V of the Treaty prohibits the extradition of individuals who commit a political offense
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C. The History of the Political Offense Doctrine in Italian

Jurisprudence
The Italian legal system has developed over a period of
twenty-four centuries and has been influenced by numerous
events, movements, and institutions.8 8 Italian extradition law,

in particular, has undergone various modifications. The repressive elements of the fascist era, combined with the more
democratic ideals of the post-World War II period, have
shaped contemporary Italian extradition practice. 9
1. The Italian Penal Code and the Italian Constitution: Two
Divergent Approaches to the Political Offense Provision
Italy, unlike many other countries, does not have a special
law on extradition.9 0 In Italian jurisprudence, three distinct
provisions govern application of the political offense doctrine.
Two provisions are found in the Constitution, while another is
found in the Penal Code. 9 ' Under Article 13 of the Italian Penal Code, extradition shall be governed by Italian penal law,
conventions, and international usage. 92 The Italian Penal
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure therefore dictate
without, however, defining a political offense. Id. As a result, domestic codes and
internal criminal procedure law dictate whether a crime is extraditable. See supra
notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing how approaches utilized by U.S. and
Italian courts regarding motivation vary considerably).
88. MARIO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 51 (1967) [hereinaf-

ter CAPPELLETTI].
89. Id.
90. MARIO PISANI, TUTELA PENALE E PROCESSO 199 (1978). The closest Italy

came to adopting a specific law on extradition was the Commission of 1881 led by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs P.S. Mancini. Id. For a discussion of the project see ATrI
DELLA COMMISSIONE MINISTERIALE PER Lo STUDIO E LA COMPILAZIONE DI UN
PROGETrO Di LEGGE SULLA ESTRADIZIONE, P.S. MANCINI (1885) (on file with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy).
91. CONsTrruriON OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, Gazz. Uff., n. 298, Dec. 27, 1947,
entered into force January 1, 1948, reprinted in Cappelletti, supra note 88, at 281
[hereinafter Italian Constitution]; Codice Penale, art. 13, reprinted in FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, supra note 84, at 5.
92. Codice Penale, art. 13, reprinted in FOREIGN PENAL CODES, supra note 84, at 5.
Article 13 of the Italian Penal Code provides "L'estradizione
regolata dalla legge
penale italiana, dalle convenzioni e dagli usi internazionali." Id. [Extradition shall be
governed by Italian Penal Law, by conventions and by international usage] (translation from FOREIGN PEN4AL CODES)' In addition, "[e]xtradition shall not be accorded if
the act giving rise to the request for extradition is not designated as an offense by
Italian law and by the foreign law." Id.

1274FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1253
when and how extradition will take place. 93 The current Penal

Code, also known as the Rocco Code (the "Italian Penal Code"
or "Penal Code"), originated during Italy's fascist era.9 4 De-

spite the collapse of Benito Mussolini's regime, the Penal Code
has remained largely intact.9 5 Following the fall of fascism, Italy adopted a new constitution, but did not renounce the
Rocco Code. 96 The inherent conflict between the democratic
principles set forth in the Italian Constitution (the "Constitution") and the fascist ideas underlying the Penal Code has materialized in relation to the political offense doctrine.
Articles 10 and 26 of the Italian Constitution prohibit the
extradition of political offenders without defining a political offense. 97 Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code, however, provides

a very broad definition of a political offense by stating that a
93. PISANI, supra note 90, at 199. Articles 661 through 671 of the Codice di
Procedura Penale (Code of Criminal Procedure) control extradition proceedings in
Italy. G.L. CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 247 (1985). Under these provisions,
[a] person whose extradition is sought may be arrested pursuant to a warrant for detention issued by the pubblico ministero upon request of the Minister of Grace and Justice. The arrest cannot extend beyond 60 days if the
State requesting the extradition is in Europe, or 90 days in any other case.
The ultimate decision rests with the government which can never order an
extradition without a favorable opinion of the instruction section of the
Court of Appeal of the district in which the person is held or was arrested.
The decision of the Court is merely a declaratory judgment subject to review by Cassation, in this case, on the merits as well.
Id.
94. FOREIGN PENAL CODES, supra note 84, at xxi. The first Italian Penal Code,
the so-called Zanardelli Code of 1889, named in honor of the Italian Minister of
Justice instrumental in its promulgation, Giuseppe Zanardelli, took a moderately liberal approach towards criminals, incorporating many of the teachings of the neoclassical school of thought. Id. at xxv. Overall, the code sought the general reduction in
the severity of punishment towards criminals. Id. Despite its international reputation (the Code was particularly influential in Latin America), the Zanardelli Code
came under attack following World War I. Id. at xxvi. Defending society against
crime, rather than seeking to proportion punishment to the crime, took center stage.
Id at xxvii. The Zanardelli Code was replaced by the Rocco Code, named in honor
of the Italian Minister ofJustice Alfredo Rocco, on July 1, 1931. Id. at xxix. The new
code, founded on the fascist principles of establishing the supremacy of the state,
greatly increased the level of punishment for crimes. Id. at xxxv. As one commentator notes, the Rocco Code was "harsh, vindictive, [and] atavistically brutal." Id.
95. Id. at xxi.
96. CONSTITTrrION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, Gazz. Uff., n. 298, Dec. 27, 1947,
entered into force January 1, 1948, reprinted in CAPPELLETrI, supra note 88, at 281.
97. Italian Constitution, art. 10, reprinted in CAPPELLETrI, supra note 88, at 282.
Article 10, paragraph 4 of the Italian Constitution provides "[n]on 6 ammessa
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political crime is any crime that either injures a political interest of the State or is inspired, in whole or in part, by political
motives. 98 The first part of the definition encompasses objective criteria, while the latter focuses on the subjective elements

that may compel an individual to commit a crime. 99
A problem emerges when an international convention or
treaty ratified by Italy defines a political offense narrowly, but
the Italian Penal Code defines it broadly.' ° The conflict is
l'estradizione dello straniero per reati politici." [There shall be no extradition of foreigners for political offenses] Id.
Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Italian Constitution provides "[l]'estradizione del
cittadino pu6 essere consentita soltanto ove sia espressamente prevista dalle convenzioni internazionali." [Extradition of citizens shall be allowed only in cases expressly
prescribed by international agreements] Id. at 286. Paragraph 2 continues, "Non
pu6 in alcun caso essere ammessa per reati politici." [It shall in no case be allowed
for political offenses]. Id. (translations from CAPPELLETrI, supra note 88, at 282).
98. MARIO ABATE, I Nuovi CODICI PENALE E Di PROCEDURA PENALE E LE LEGGI
COMPLEMENTARI 82 (1991). Article 8, paragraph 3 provides: "Agli effetti della legge
penale, delitto politico ogni delitto, che offende un interesse politico dello Stato,
ovvero un diritto politico del cittadino. E altresi considerato delitto politico il delitto
comune determinato, in tutto o in parte, da motivi politici." [For purposes of penal
law, a political crime shall be any crime which injures a political interest of the State,
or a political right of a citizen. A common crime inspired, in whole or in part, by
political motives shall also be deemed a political crime] Codice Penale, art. 8, reprinted
in FOREIGN PENAL CODES, supra note 84, at 3.
99. FOREIGN PENAL CODES, supra note 84, at 3.
100. Antonio La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, International Law
and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM.J. INT'L L. 598, 603 (1985). Under Italian jurisprudence, whenever an ordinary law conflicts with customary international law incorporated into the national legal system, "customary international law takes precedence
over ordinary statutory law because Article 10 . . .gives the incorporated international law constitutional rank." Id. The Italian solution "is designed to guarantee
respect for international law and . . .to diminish the possibility of another war by
integrating the state into the international community." Id. This framework has two
consequences. First, "the requirement of its application can be altered only by constitutional amendment; and second, it may be applied only through ... centralized
constitutional review." Id. Because the dualist view prevails in Italy, "customary international law is considered as external law continuously being incorporated into
national law" via Article 10. Id. at 605. Thus, "constitutional values can take precedence over constitutional acceptance of international law ... [because] for Italian
jurists, constitutional values ...

ought to prevail over other values, even... interna-

tional law." Id. Thus, hypothetically, if genocide were to become accepted by international law and thus became part of Italian law, it would have to be rejected for it
would be incompatible with the constitutional provisions.
The constitutional framework plays a significant role with regard to treaties. Id.
Under Article 80 of the Constitution, ratification of a treaty requires the passage of
an ordinary law by Parliament. Id. at 606. A treaty thus bears the rank of an ordinary law, and as such, is subject to later modification both by the legislature and
ordinary judges. Id. at 607. An understanding of this framework explains how the
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caused by the provisions set forth in Article 10 of the Italian
Constitution, which provide that the Italian legal system must
conform with generally recognized principles of international
law.' 0 ' The Italian courts have thus been confronted with the
rather arduous task of determining whether Article 8 of the
Italian Penal Code should be given deference when defining a
political offense pursuant to Articles 10 and 26 of the Italian
0 2

Constitution. 1

Court of Cassation had the authority to impose a new standard regarding the political
offense provision and why Article 8 of the Penal Code was ultimately held to be
subordinate to Articles 10 and 26 of the Constitution in light of the current trend in
international law to diffuse the political offense doctrine. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992
(Khaled Mohammed ElJassem), Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Pen. I/a, Sentence No.
767.
101. Italian Constitution, art. 10, reprinted in CAPPELLErIr, supra note 88, at 282.
Article 10, paragraph 1 provides, "L'ordinamento giuridico italiano si conforma alle
norme del diritto internazionale generalmente riconosciute." [The Italian legal order shall conform to the generally recognized rules of international law] (translation
from CAPPELLETrI, supra note 88, at 282). See La Pergola & Del Duca, supra note 100,
at 599 (discussing importance of international law in Italian legal system).
Following World War II, Italy sought to guarantee that it would never again
become a totalitarian state. La Pergola, supra note 100, at 599. As a result, the Italian Constitution adopted international law as part of the national legal system. Id.
To understand the Italian legal system, it is important to know that by adopting international law, Italy does not accept the monist view of sovereignty and thereby
subordinate its national legal system to a superior legal order. Id. at 601. Unlike
most countries who adopt international law as part of the national legal system, a
dualist view prevails in Italy so that international law and national law are considered
separate systems. Id. "Therefore, Article 10 of the Italian Constitution ...isseen as
permanently transforming customary international law into domestic law. By using
the word 'conforms,' Article 10 implies that as customary international law evolves,
the Italian legal order will adopt it continuosly and automatically [without the need
for implementing legislation]." Id.
The task of discovering changes in international law is reserved exclusively to
the Constitutional Court. Id. Thus, if domestic law conflicts with customary international law applicable to a particular case, the Constitutional Court is the sole power
entrusted "to establish the superiority of international law." Id. at 602.
102. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 197. The implications of choosing
either the Penal Code or the constitutional provisions are so complex that Italian
jurists, legislators, and legal scholars have debated the issue for over forty years without reaching a consensus. Giuliano Vassalli, II Delitto Politico, in OUADERNI DELLA
GIUSTIZIA 1, 4-5 (1982) [hereinafter Vassalli].
The prevailing view in Italian jurisprudence, prior to the cases immediately preceding In re AI-Jawaty, was that Article 8 of the Penal Code was to be given precedence over the Constitutional provisions when assessing the political nature of an
act. Id. "La prevalente dottrina ed anche la giurisprudenza hanno sempre affermato
che la nozione andava ricercata nel codice penale vigente (art. 8, 3 comma)." Id.
Recently, numerous writers have suggested various reasons as to why the traditional
Italian approach of reverting to Article 8 of the Penal Code is incorrect. See, e.g.,
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Article 8 of the Penal Code represents a distinct attempt
by the fascist regime to depart from the penal code in effect

prior to 1930, the Zanardelli Code,10 3 and to eliminate the
political offense exception from Italian law.1°4 In this way, the
0 5
fascist regime could punish political offenders more harshly.

Unlike the previous Zanardelli Code, the Rocco Code contains
no provision for barring the extradition of political offenders.10 6 The interpretation of the Rocco Code coincides with
supra note 12, at 199, citing various jurists such as Quadri (noting that prevailing doctrine is erroneous because it would formally create framework
whereby constitutional notion of political offense would depend entirely on definition prescribed by ordinary law, thereby inverting logical order of legal principles:
constitutional provisions must serve as measure for ordinary laws, and not vice
versa); Nuvolone (emphasizing that Articles 10 and 26 of Constitution have not assimilated definition of political offense prescribed in Article 8 because neither constitutional article discusses deferring definition of political offense to other norms). In
fact, as Article 10, paragraph 1 reveals, any time the legislature intended to defer
definition of one law by reference to another, the article expressly provided for it. Id.
at 199-201; Mantovani (discussing that constitutional provisions do not coincide with
Article 8 of Penal Code because while in former political offense is much broader and
designed to protect human principles (e.g. right to political asylum), in latter it serves
repressive function). Id. at 209-210. Striani notes that of the three proposals,
Mantovani's approach is correct because under his interpretation, the constitutional
principles would embrace all types of crimes, common and political, which the requesting state may punish for political purposes. Id. Whether the crime is political is
a decision which must rest with the requested state. Id. Thus, when a state analyzes
an offense, those crimes manifestly contrary to the Constitution of the requested
state, such as terrorism, genocide, and crimes against humanity, would not be considered political offenses. Id. But see Aloisi-Fini and Sabatini, CATELANI & STRIANI, supra
note 12, at 202 (emphasizing that constitutional articles contain no definition of
political offense, thereby leading to conclusion that notion of political offense must
be assessed by reverting to only law still in effect which does provide a definition,
Article 8).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing Zanardelli era).
104. Nicola Mazzacuva, Reato Politico e Divieto di EstradizioneDel Cittadino Nella Costituzione, in L'INDICE PENALE 229 (May-Aug. 1980). "[1l fin troppo . .. sottolineare
...che l'ampia definizione di delitto politico ivi accolta fu dettata da evidenti finalit6
d'ordine repressivo." Id. at 240. "La ratio della norma veniva chiaramente messa in
luce nella relazione ministeriale: 'per uno Stato che sia consapevole della propria
forza e della propria autoriti e che per il conseguimento dei propri fini voglia
difendere l'una e l'altra contro qualsiasi attentato, dovunque e da chiunque commesso . . . ' Id. at 240 n.6. "[L]a vecchia concezione del delitto politico, quasi
pervasa di una specie di sentimentalismo storico, perdeva di vista la realti delle cose
e con essa, poiche i due termini non sono antitetici, anche quelle che debbono essere
le sole idealiti di uno Stato forte." Id. at 241 n.6.
105. Id.
106. TIZIANA T. LUPACCHINI, L'ESTRADIZIONE DALL'ESTERO PER L'ITALIA 128
(1989). Article 9 of the Zanardelli Code provided "L'estradizione dello straniero
non 6 ammessa per i reati politici, n6 per i reati che a questi siano connessi." Id.
CATELANI & STRIANI,
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the spirit of the fascist regime which sought to repress individual freedom in order to establish state dominance. 0 7 The
drafters of Article 8, therefore, did not have extradition in

mind when they adopted the provision. 0 8 They solely intended to expand application of the Italian penal law to political crimes committed both in and outside of Italy.

09

The

107. Id. at 128-129. See Vassalli, supra note 102, at 1 (citing legislative history of
1930 Code). "Data la direzione della volonti dell'agente . . . [i delitti che offendevono gli]
interessi politici dello Stato... per il bene della colletiviti, dallo Stato
rappresentata, [dovevono] essere repress[i]." Id. at 2. "In perfetta antitesi con la
concezione dello Stato liberale o demo-liberale, lo Stato fascista non pu6 consentire
che energie individuali spieghino in alcuna guisa, e per qualsiasi motivo, una attivita
contrastante con i suoi interessi politici." Id. at 1. (In perfect contrast to a democratic State, the fascist State cannot permit individuals to conduct in any manner, and
for whatever motive, an activity opposing the State's political interests.) (translation
by Comment Author). According to the fascist ideology, the relation between the
State and the individual was to remain constantly unaltered. Id. The State therefore
would not tolerate any individual activity which would threaten the collective interest.
Id.
The fascist regime perceived political offenders as the greatest threat to the
State's stability. LUPACCHINI, supra note 106, at 129. The traditional glorification of
political offenders was therefore abandoned. Vassalli, supra note 102, at 2. "[Ill
Fascismo [sorge] per instaurare I'autoritA dello Stato... [ed] [iun tema di delitti politici,
addirittura capovolge le vecchie concezioni, seguendo per la prima volta. ..un indirizzo ad esse decisamente contrario." Id.
108. Antonio Pagliaro, La Nozione di Reato Politico Agli Effetti Dell'Estradizione, in
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRrrro E PROCEDURA PENALE 807 (1983). "Questa dizione [del
articolo 8 c.p.], nel contesto normativo in cui era stata formulata, non aveva nulla a
che fare con il problema dell'estradizione (nel codice del 1930 non esisteva affatto un
divieto di estradizione per delitti politici)." Id. (A reading of Article 8, within the
normative context in which it was formulated, reveals that it had nothing to do with
the problem of extradition (the 1930 Code did not contain any political offense exceptions to extradition) (translation by Comment Author). "Essa era stata concepita
per dilatare quanto pit6 6 possibile l'applicabiliti della legge penale italiana ai delitti
politici commessi all'estero." Id. at 807-08. (Article 8 was drafted to expand as
broadly as possible the application of Italian Penal Law to political crimes committed
outside of Italy) (translation by Comment Author). But see LUPACCHINI, supra note
106, at 131 (noting how drafters claimed that by passing such act, Italy could now
provide unlimited cooperation to other states to combat what legislators felt was one
of major concerns of foreign governments, punishing [political] crimes).
109. Pagliaro, supra note 108, at 807. See PISANI, supra note 90, at 207 (noting
"[ill legislatore del 1930 aveva coniato la nozione di delitto politico per derivarnenella prospettiva di una maggior perseguibiliti dei delitti politici commessi
all'estero-una tutela rafforzata per gli interessi politici dello Stato italiano e dei diritti politici del cittadino italiano"). "L'articolo 8, ult. co ... , era stato voluto ...
proprio per consentire una pii agevole procedibiliti per i delitti politici commessi
all'estero dal cittadino e dallo straniero." Id. at 217. (Article 8 was precisely adopted
to facilitate proceeding against Italians and non-nationals who committed political
crimes outside of Italy) (translation by Comment Author). The legislators purposely
provided such a broad definition to Article 8 so as to expand the repressive power of
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broad language of Article 8 converted virtually any crime to a
political offense,"

0

thus granting the Italian state authority to

prosecute any individual, citizen or non-Italian, who committed an act that the state did not approve."'
Ironically, in the period between 1930 and 1948, the ma-

jority of bilateral treaties that Italy negotiated contained provisions for exempting political offenders from extradition." l2
Thus, a problem arose whenever a state requested the extradition of an individual from Italy and relied on the treaty in force
between the two nations, but the treaty handled the political
offense issue differently than the Italian Penal Code.' 11 To settle the matter, most of the treaties provided that the ultimate
decision regarding the political nature of the crime vested with
I t4
the requested state.
the State. La Convenzione Europea Per La Repressione Del Terrorismo: Analisi Critica, in
UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDi Di TRIESTE: ISTiTUZIONI EUROPEE E LOTrA AL TERRORISMO

14, 31 (1986).
110. Pietro Nuvolone, Delitto Politico e Diritto D 'silo, in L'INDICE PENALE 171-74
(Jan.-Apr. 1970). Nuvolone discusses the objective and subjective elements incorporated in Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code. Id. The objective element holds that "a
political crime shall be any crime which injures a political interest of the State, or a
political right of a citizen." Id. The subjective element states that "a common crime

inspired, in whole or in part, by political motives shall also be deemed a political
crime." Id. at 171. Nuvolone concludes there is only one essential difference between the provisions. Id. The objective element affirms State supremacy and thereby
seeks to punish persons who offend any State interest. Id. The subjective element is
directed to punish the motives that lead one to commit a political crime. Id. at 174.
The distinction, straightforward as it may appear, reflects how the very broad nature
of Article 8 converts virtually any crime to a political offense. Id.

111. Vassalli, supra note 102, at 2. "[L]a eccessiva estensione del delitto soggettivamente politico... arrivava ad abbracciare, nel suo odio, anche fatti comuni commessi per moventi comuni, purch6 in essi fosse rinvenibile, anche in minima parte,
una finaliti politica." Id.; see Nuvolone, supra note 110, at 178 (discussing that via
Art. 7 1 and Art. 8 1 of Italian Penal Code, the Italian State, in addition to the
territoriality and personality principles ofjurisdiction, reserved for itself jurisdiction
to prosecute both citizens and foreigners solely on basis of defending State interests).
112. VALERIA DEL TUFO, ESTRADIZIONE E REATO POLITico 68 (1985). Italian
treaties contained political offense provisions because of the traditional noble view

the Italian legal system had adopted towards political offenders. Id. at 125. The
treaties containing the political offense provisions included the 1896 Treaty with Tunisia, the 1899 Treaty with Mexico, the additional protocol of 1886 with Argentina
(entered into force in 1904), the 1907 Treaty with Paraguay, and the 1922 Treaty
with Austria. PISANI, supra note 90, at 207-08.

113. PISANI, supra note 90, at 209.
114. DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 68. The practice of reverting to Article 8 to
determine if a common crime constituted a political offense developed in In re

Pavelic, Judgment of Nov. 23, 1934, Sezione Istrutt. della Corte d'appello di Torino,

1280 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1253
The introduction of the political offense exception in the
Italian Constitution of 1948 permitted the Italian legal system
to protect political offenders from extradition and thus return

to the tradition of the Zanardelli era." 15 The drafters, however,
overlooked the fact that Article 8 of the Rocco Code was still in
effect. 1 6 Furthermore, the legislative history of Articles 10
and 26 failed to direct the courts as to whether the Constitution or the Penal Code should control.' '1
Articles 10 and 26 created an absolute ban on extraditing
political offenders, but neither article defined a political offense."1 8 Only Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code offered a solution, but its broad definition permitted all common crimes to
attain political offense status simply by considering the offender's subjective motivation."t 9 The legislature's failure to
in Riv. Pen. 1383 (1934). Id. at 71 n.10. The French judicial authorities sought the

extradition of two Yugoslav citizens, Pavelic and Kwaternich, who were accused of
murdering King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs
following an attack conducted in Marseille, France. Id. The Appellate Court of Turin denied the request on the grounds that the crime constituted a political act under
Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Italian Penal Code, and not on the basis that the convention signed by Italy and France exempted political offenders from extradition. Id. at
72.
115. Vassalli, supra note 102, at 3; LUPACCHINI, supra note 106, at 132-33. Article 10 of the Constitution, 4 exempted Italian citizens accused of political crimes
from extradition, and art. 26, 2 applied to foreigners. Italian Constitution, Art. 10
and 26, reprinted in CAPPELLETr, supra note 88, at 282.
116. Vassalli, supra note 102, at 3.
117. Vassalli, supra note 102, at 3; PISANI, supra note 90, at 206.
118. Mazzacuva, supra note 104, at 239.
119. See Vassalli, supra note 102, at 3. "Era infatti veramente aberrante che
restradizione potesse venir rifiutata per un reato comune, magari gravissimo, sol per
il fatto della presenza nell'animo dell'agente di un anche minimo movente politico
pur in concorso con altri motivi." Id.; see also Mazzacuva, supra note 104, at 244 (noting "[a]lla stregua dell'art. 8 c.p. era, infatti, sufficiente che un delitto comune fosse
dettato anche parzialmente da motivi politici per rendere perseguibile il reato");
Domenico Manzione, Vecchie e Nuove Prospettive Nei Rapporti Tra Reato Politico ed Estradi-

zione, Cassazione Penale 219 (1985) (asserting that Article 8 "opera al riguardo,
un'indiscriminata apertura alla rilevanza dei motivi dell'agente"). For an indepth
look at the legislative history of Article 8 see V Lavori Preparaton del Codice Penale e del
Codice di Procedura Penale 40 (1929).
The legislative history of Article 8 reveals that the Rocco Code considered terrorist and anarchist crimes political offenses. DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 69. Minister Rocco himself noted, "[Nion ho riprodotto . . .il caso relativo ai delitti dolosi
commessi con materie esplodenti, accecanti o asfissianti a danno di cittadino italiano,
in quanto la relativa ipotesi pu6 ritenersi compresa nella piii larga previsione contenuta nell'articolo 8, a norma del quale 6 punito secondo la legge italiana ilcittadino
o lo straniero, che commetta all'estero qualsiasi delitto, che possa considerasi polit-
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provide any guidance as to which article should control when
assessing a political crime left the question within the courts'
discretion. No evidence existed that the legislature sought to
depart from the customary approach of reverting to Article 8
of the Penal Code when evaluating the political nature of a
crime.12 0 Unable to discern legislative intent, the courts chose
to adopt the traditional view in effect prior to the institution of
2
Articles 10 and 26 of the Constitution.' '
ico, a danno dello Stato o di un cittadino." Id.; see also Mazzacuva, supra note 104, at
245 (noting "l'anarchismo, come ogni altra simile attivitA antisociale, considerato
dal codice delitto contro la personalitA dello Stato, cosi che non pu6 dubitarsi che i
delitti communi determinati da motivi anarchici o altrimenti antisociali siano delitti
soggettivamente ed oggettivamente politici"). The same attitude prevailed regarding
terrorist crimes. Id. at n.18. See generally, DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 73 (noting
statements by Manzini and Longhi regarding political nature of terrorist crimes:
"[Pier il vigente codice penale, i delitti anarchici o terroristici in genere, sono indubbiamente politici," and "([T]ra i reati politici) sono quindi compresi i reati terroristici"). (In the current penal code, anarchist and terrorist crimes, in general, are undoubtedly political. Thus, political crimes include terrorist offenses) (translation by
Comment Author).
120. PISANI, supra note 90, at 216; DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 68, 74-75 (discussing "il legislatore Costituente italiano aveva dietro di s una tradizione giuridica
sufficientemente consolidata in tema di estradizione per reati politici. Secondo
questa tradizione il concetto di delitto politico ai fini estradizionali viene fornito
dall'art. 8 c.p.. La nozione comprende anche... reati anarchici e terroristici") (The
Italian legislature was confronted with a strong tradition regarding extradition and
political crimes. According to this tradition, Article 8 of the Penal Code furnished
the definition of political crimes. The notion of political offenses encompassed both
anarchist and terrorist crimes as well.) (translation by Comment Author). According
to some writers, if the drafters of the Constitution, well aware of the traditional mode
of referring to Article 8 of the Penal Code to assess a political crime, had wanted to
introduce a new approach via Articles 10 and 26 of the Constitution, the drafters
would have done so explicitly. Id. These writers thus concluded that Articles 10 and
26 adopted the definition for political offenses within the parameters set forth in
Article 8 of the Penal Code. Id.
121. DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 5-9 (discussing In re Wagner, In re Cartonnet,
In re Minvielle, In re Court). Early decisions reveal how the courts adhered to this
approach without recognizing the ramifications. Id.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing how Minister Rocco intended terrorist crimes to be considered political crimes). But see CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 216 (discussing how Italian courts, in adopting traditional notion of political offense by reverting to Article 8, may have attributed broader meaning to political offense provision under Article 8 than originally contemplated by
Rocco Code). For example, in the extradition case of In re Koronakis, Judgment of
Sept. 6, 1957, Corte di Cassazione, in Giustizia Penale II (1958), Greek authorities
requested the extradition of a Greek citizen accused of placing a time bomb before
the Greek Ministry ofJustice building. Id. Mr. Koronakis alleged his act was politically motivated, but the court upheld extradition on the grounds that even though
the accused alleged he was subjectively motivated, he had failed to prove it. Id. The
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2. Decisions Rendered by Italian Courts Adhering to the

Traditional Approach
A series of decisions in the 1960s made it apparent that
the traditional approach to the political offense issue required

reformulation. 2 2 In In re Zind,123 a German national was sentenced by the Federal Republic of Germany for expressing
support for Adolf Hitler's extermination of the Jews in World
War II and thereby desecrating the name of holocaust victims. 24 The Italian Court of Cassation, 25 subsequent to an
extradition request by Germany, refused to extradite Mr. Zind
on the grounds that his act constituted a political offense under
Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code. 26 Pursuant to Article 10 of
the Constitution, the Court of Cassation concluded that Mr.
court noted that "the accused's affirmations are irrelevant, for the political motive
must emerge from the positive elements that accompany the act." Id. (translation of
Italian text by Comment Author). The court added that a political offense can be
considered subjectively motivated when it is directed, in the accused's mind, to influence the constitution and functioning of the State, or otherwise to further political,
social or religious ideas for the principal purpose of realizing a political idea. Id.
This interpretation was adopted by the courts to define subjective political offenses
under Article 8. Id.
Striani notes that in the legislative history of Article 8, a subjectively motivated
crime was to be considered a political offense because in the accused's mind, the act
was committed to offend a political interest of the State. CATELANI & STRIANI, Supra
note 12, at 217. In the legislator's mind, the act should be considered political in
order that it could be repressed to safeguard the community's interest, for the benefit
of the State. Id. Striani adds that for the courts to interpret the subjective notion of a
political offense to embrace acts directed to further political, social or religious interests of the accused is a broad expansion of the principles established in the original
article by the drafters. Id. at 216.
122. Giovannangelo De Francesco, Reato Politico, in 38 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRrrro 902 (1987).
123. Judgment of Apr. 5, 1961, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at 68, reprinted
in DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 11 n.30.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing framework of Italian
legal system).
126. Judgment of April 5, 1962 (In re Zind), Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at
68. The Court held "ll
motivo del reato deve definirsi politico, quando esso consenta
di delineare lo scopo dell'agente, che deve trascendere la persona del suo autore ed
investire in tutto o in parte interessi che attengano all'attuazione di contrastanti
idealitA e concezioini politiche e che nella valutazione di tale scopo dell'azione deve
prescindersi da ogni giudizio in ordine alla moralitA, socialit e nobilt delle idee e
delle finalitA perseguite, che possono anche presentarsi con carattere vessatorio nei
confronti di coloro." Id., reprinted in DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 214-15.
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Zind was automatically exempt from extradition.' 27
The decision mirrored the holding rendered by the Italian
Court of Appeals of Bologna128 in In re Kr'ger. 12 9 Once again,
Germany requested from Italy the extradition of an individual
sentenced in the Federal Republic. 30 The Court of Appeals
stressed that under Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code, the subjective and objective elements of an act must be weighed when
assessing the political nature of a crime.' 3 ' The Court of Appeals denied the extradition request holding that the act was
subjectively politically motivated. 132 Despite the criticism that
emerged following the decision,13 3 the courts refused to limit
the broad application of Article 8.
127. Judgment of Apr. 5, 1962 (In re Zind), Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at
68, reprinted in DEL TuFo, supra note 112, at 214-15.
128. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing framework of Italian
court system).
129. Judgment ofJan. 11, 1963, Corte d'appello di Bologna, in Foro It. II at 74,
reprinted in DEL TuFo, supra note 112, at 12 n.33.
130. Id. Unlike Mr. Zind, however, Mr. Kr6ger had murdered over 3000 Jews
and mental patients during World War II. Id.
131. Id.
132. DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 12. The court rendered the decision despite
noting the gravity of the crime. "[N]onostante la loro eccezionale gravit:i, non possono non essere ritenuti soggetivamente politici." Id. The court held the acts were
surely committed in adherence to the ideological and political principles of nazism
and to further German State interests. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12 at 215.
133. ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITrO, supra note 122, at 903. See CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 215-16 n.49 (discussing how Italy was part of Genocide Convention that expressly stated that genocide is not political offense and how Court of
Appeals chose to uphold principles set forth in Article 8 of Penal Code rather than
modify internal code with provisions of Genocide Convention). The court's reasoning may be understood in terms of the way the Italian legal system functions. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing importance afforded to ordinary
conventions in Italian legal system). Under Article 10, 1, of the Italian Constitution, Italy's legal system conforms with the generally recognized principles of international law. Id. It would appear that the Genocide Convention automatically became part of Italy's law, but this was not true because conventions are given the same
weight as ordinary law and therefore if inconsistent with the Italian penal system, the
latter prevails, and the political nature of single acts, here genocide, was not, at the
time, considered a generally recognized principle of international law. See supra note
100 and accompanying text (discussing importance afforded to ordinary conventions
in Italian legal system).
The court ultimately erred in its final analysis because even if the above holds
true, genocide is incompatible to the Constitutional protections afforded by the Italian legal system and on these grounds the court should have granted Mr. Kr6ger's
extradition. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing incompatibility of
international law with Italian Constitution). To avoid future decisions like Kr6"er, a
constitutional amendment was passed on June 21, 1967 stating explicitly that geno-
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3. The European Convention on the Suppression of

Terrorism and the Subsequent Departure by Italian
Courts from the Traditional Approach
The rise of international terrorism in the 1970s made it
apparent that Italian courts needed to modify the traditional
approach to avoid decisions such as In re Krb'er and bring terrorists to justice.1 4 The traditional approach of referring to
Article 8 of the Penal Code, however, was so deeply rooted in
Italian jurisprudence that changes could only occur gradually. 1 3 5 Nations adopted numerous conventions condemning
terrorism during the 1970s in an effort to increase international cooperation to combat terrorist crimes. 1 36 Among these
treaties, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 3 7 (the "Convention") dealt directly with the political
offense exception to international extradition.' 3 8 Italy ratified
the Convention, but invoked Article 13 of the Convention to
retain the right to refuse to extradite an individual for an act
deemed to be a political offense under the Italian Constitution. 139 Despite this reservation, Italy's ratification of the Concide does not constitute a political offense under either Article 10 or 26 of the Constitution. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 216 n.49.
134. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 45 (discussing how terrorism, like term political
offense, has not been defined by international community). Numerous efforts have
been adopted to fight terrorism including multilateral conventions, see supra note 2,
bilateral agreements, and United Nations Resolutions, see United Nations Resolution on
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc.
A/40/53 (1985), but no single definition has emerged. Sapiro, supra note 56, at 655.
In Italy, the Ministry of the Interior declared, "I1 terrorista un crimine e deve essere
trattato come tale, quali che siano le sue motivazioni: questa 6 la posizione molto
ferma dei ministri dell'interno dei nove paesi della Comunita recentemente riunitisi a
Londra." Lottare Contro l Terrorismo, in 23 EUROFORUM 4 (June 7, 1977).
135. Vassalli, supra note 102, at 3-5.
136. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of January 27,
1977, E.T.S. 90, reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976); [hereinafter Convention or Strasbourg Convention].
137. Id.
138. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 136; MURPHY, supra note 5, at 13. The
Convention attempts to limit those crimes that may be regarded as political offenses
inspired by political motives by listing a series of crimes that parties to the Convention are to exclude from the political offense exception to extradition. Id. at 13-14.
For a list of these crimes, see MURPHY, supra note 5, at 13.
139. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 136, art. 13, 15 I.L.M. at 1275 (noting
any State could reserve right to refuse extradition with respect to any offense mentioned in Article 1 which it considered to be political offense, offense connected with
political offense or offense inspired by political motives). The reservation provision
has raised serious doubts about the Convention's efficacy, for it allows states who
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vention signified a departure from its traditional approach to
the political offense question. In an effort to apply the Convention to Italian jurisprudence, Italian jurists proposed to
give the political offense exception of Articles 10 and 26 of the
Constitution a new meaning by departing from the traditional
approach of referring to the definition set forth in Article 8 of
the Penal Code. 140
agree to be bound to adopt a reservation to preserve their right to assess the political
offense question under domestic principles, thus limiting the very purpose for which
the Convention was adopted - reaching uniform consensus on the political offense
question to increase cooperation in combatting terrorism. See also CATELANI & STRIANT, supra note 12, at 235 n.70 (citing GHISLAINE FRAYSSE-DRUESNE, La Repression du
Terrorisme, in REV. GEN. DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 969 (1978)). The most significant provision of Article 13 focuses on the factors reserving states must take into
account when evaluating the character of an offense. Art. 13, Strasbourg Convention, supra note 136, at 538. As Article 13 makes clear, a reservation may be made
provided that [the reserving state] undertakes to take into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offence, any particularly serious
aspects of the offence, including:
a. that it created a collective danger to the life, physical integrity or
liberty of persons; or
b. that it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it; or
c. that cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of the
offence.
Id.
Under Italian law, conventions are given the same authority as ordinary law. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing role of conventions in Italian legal
system). As a result, conventions must abide by the principles set forth in the Italian
Constitution, otherwise they will be deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court. Id. This principle contrasts sharply with U.S. law where treaties are accorded
the same authority as the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Pursuant to Article 13 of the Strasbourg Convention, Italy reserved the right to deny extraditing an
individual when the offense committed constituted a political offense under the Italian Constitution. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 136, art. 13, 15 I.L.M. at 1275,
reprinted in Maria-Riccarda Marchetti, Istituzioni Europeee Lotta al Terrorismo 161 (1986).
The reservation was an effort by the Italian government to assure that the Italian
approach to the political offense provision, and not Article 1 of the Strasbourg Convention, remained the primary source for evaluating political offenses. Marchetti,
supra at 161. Absent the reservation, the Convention would have been deemed unconstitutional for an ordinary law cannot violate the principles of the Italian Constitution. Id. The Strasbourg Convention was ratified by Italy on November 26, 1985
with the following reservation:
Lo Stato italiano, facendo uso della facolt prevista dall'articolo 13 della
convenzione e tenendo conto anche dei criteri per la valutazione della
politicitA del reato in tale articolo indicati, rifiuteri l'estradizione riguardo a
qualsiasi reato elencato nell'articolo 1 della convenzione stessa che sia da
considerare politico, nel rispetto della Costituzione italiana.
Id.
140. 1 Limiti All'Estradizione, in XIII ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA, Sez. III, Diritto In-
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Several decisions rendered by Italian courts in the period
following the Convention reflect a gradual departure from Italy's traditional approach to the political offense question. In

In re Locatelli,'4 ' Switzerland requested the extradition of Luigi
Locatelli, a Swiss national located in Italy and accused of defrauding the Swiss National Bank of Lugano. 42 Mr. Locatelli
claimed that his act was politically motivated and that his extra143
dition would violate Article 10 of the Italian Constitution.
The Italian Court of Cassation14 4 refuted his allegations,

stressing that the political motive must be deduced from the
nature of the act and that the accused's mere assertion that he

acted for a political purpose is irrelevant. 45 The Court noted
that even though Article 8 of the Penal Code defines the political character of an offense, fraudulent crimes committed

against the state did not constitute political offenses.' 46 This
decision marked the first attempt by the Italian courts to limit
the broad reach of the political offense provision in Article
ternazionale 5-6 (1989). "La dottrina italiana ha proposto di dare al concetto di
reato politico previsto dalla Costituzione in relazione all'estradizione significati
diversi, sganciati, di preferenza, dalla definizione del codice penale." Id. Parliamentary debates on the Strasbourg Convention indicate that the traditional approach of
referring to Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code to interpret Articles 10 and 26 of the
Constitution was no longer recognized as the only solution for assessing the political
nature of a crime in an extradition request. DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 37-40; see
supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing various solutions developed by
Italian jurists as to which Article should control in assessing political nature of
crime).
141. Judgment of Jan. 18, 1978, Corte di Cassazione, in Giust. Pen. III at 148,
reprinted in DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 13.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See note 15 and accompanying text (discussing framework of Italian Legal
system).
145. Judgment ofJan. 18, 1978 (In re Locatelli), Corte di Cassazione, Giust. Pen.
III at 154, reprinted in DEL TuFo, supra note 112, at 13.
146. Id. The Court echoed the Court of Appeals decision rendered in Kr'ger,
Corte d'appello di Bologna, in Foro It. II at 74, by stating "cio che caratterizza il
delitto soggettivamente politico 6 ilmotivo che permette il delinearsi dello scopo
dell'agente, che deve trascendere la persona dell'autore ed investire, in tutto o in
parte, interessi che attengano all'attuazione di contrastanti idealitA e concezioni politiche..." [a subjective political offense is characterized by the actor's motive which
permits delineation of the actor's purpose. The motive, however, must transcend
personal wishes and invest interests directed towards furthering conflicting political
ideals and conceptions] (translation by Comment Author). Locatelli, Corte di Cassazione, in Giust. Pen. III at 154, reprinted in DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 13 n.39.
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8.147

In 1982, the Italian Court of Cassation provided the first

real departure from the traditional approach to the political offense exception. In In re Musbach,' 48 the Federal Republic of
Germany requested Italy's extradition of Mr. Musbach, a Libyan national accused of murdering a compatriot pursuant to

orders received from a revolutionary Libyan movement. 49
The accused claimed that his act constituted a political offense

50
under Italian law, thereby exempting him from extradition.1
The Court of Cassation held that under Italian law, the political nature of a crime must be assessed first by reference to
Article 8 of the Penal Code,' 5 ' and then to Article 10 of the

147. Judgment ofJan. 18, 1978 (In re Locatelli), Corte di Cassazione, Giust. Pen.
III at 148, reprinted in DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 13. Throughout Europe a trend
developed to limit the political offense exception regarding terrorists and became
evident in the French cases In re Piperno, judgment of Oct. 17, 1979, Cour d'appel,
Paris, T.A.C.P., and In re Pace, judgment of Nov. 7, 1979, Cour d'appel, Paris,
T.A.C.P. 367, reprinted in Littenburg, supra note 84, at 1204-05; CATELANI & STRIANI,
supra note 12, at 246. Italy requested the extradition of Red Brigade members accused of kidnapping and murdering the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and his
escorts. Id. In French jurisprudence, the extradition of political offenders is controlled by French law of 1927 which provides that extradition will be denied for political crimes or requests that are made for political reasons ["Lorsque le crime ou delit
a un caract~re politique ou lorsqu'il r~sulte des circonstances que l'extradition est
demand~e dans un but politique"]. Guido Salvini, Spazio Giudiziario Europeo e Delitto
Politico, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITrO E PROCEDURA PENALE 992, 999-1000 (1980).
In addition, Article 698 of the French Procedural Code contains a provision for subjective political crimes analogous to Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code. Id. at 1000.
The French court focused on the gravity of the crimes and the death of innocent
victims (the escorts), holding "the political context wanes in the face of the hideous
character of the aggression." Id. The court granted the extradition requests and
noted that via the 1927 law, "the legislature intended to permit extradition for every
offense the rude, wild, or inexcusable character of which would shock the universal
consciousness." Littenburg, supra note 84, at 1204. The decision is significant because France had yet to ratify the Strasbourg Convention of 1977, but chose to grant
the extradition request based on the gravity of the crime, evidence that the French
court did not wish to extend the political offense exception to terrorist crimes.
Salvini, supra, at 1002-04. This approach was affirmed in subsequent decisions rendered by the French court in which it granted the extradition of German and Spanish
terrorists, each time stressing that the heinous nature of the crimes precluded an
examination of the offenders' political motivation. Littenburg, supra note 84, at
1204.
148. Judgment of January 14, 1982, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at 125,
reprinted in DEL TUFO, supra note 112, at 13 n.40.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Angelo Ferraro, In Tema di Divieto di Estradizione Per Reati Politici, in Cassazione Penale 1113 (1983). For a common crime to be considered subjectively polit-
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Constitution.

52

In discussing Article 10 of the Constitution,

the Court held that only those offenders who commit an act
outside of Italy in an effort to oppose an illegitimate regime, or
seek to assert a fundamental freedom expressly forbidden in
their own country, or prove that the request for surrender by
the requesting state has been made for political reasons will be
exempted from extradition. 53 In the present case, the Court
reasoned that Mr. Musbach's political motives were extraneous
to the political system in Germany.15 4 More importantly, the
Court found that Germany, a democratic state withdrawn from
the ideological conflict of Libyan nationals, would have no reason to be influenced by political motives in requesting Mr.
Musbach's surrender other than to bring the accused to justice. 155 The Court therefore granted Germany's request for
5 6
Mr. Musbach's return.1
4. Modern Integration of International Norms

with Italian Law
In the past decade, Italian courts began to conform Italian
law with prevailing international norms condemning terrorism
in an effort to further restrict the broad application of Article 8
to political crimes. 1 57 The movement culminated with the
ical, the Court held that it must be qualified by a strictly and exclusively political
motive. Id. "II reo deve essere stato spinto a delinquere dal fine di potere, a mezzo
della sua azione, incidere sulla esistenza, costituzione, o funzionamento dello Stato,
oppure favorire o contrastare idee, tendenze politiche, sociali o religiose al precipuo
scopo di realizzare una idea politica." Id. The court added that the offender must be
moved to commit his act, even through the commission of a common crime, to offend
a political interest of the state or a political right of a citizen. Id. The decision reconfirms the Court's holding in both Locatelli, Corte di Cassazione, in Giust. Pen. III
at 148, and Zind, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. at 68.
152. Judgment ofJan. 14. 1982 (In re Musbach), Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It.
II. at 125.
153. Id. at 128. "Nel nostro ordinamento devono ritenersi tutelati con il divieto
di estradizione gli autori dei reati commessi all'estero sia quando il movente dei reati
stessi sia stato quello do opporsi a regime illiberale o di affermare un diritto di libertA
il cui esercizio negato nel loro paese, sia quando si abbia fondato motivo di ritenere
che il giudizio nello Stato richiedente possa essere influenzato da fattori ideologici o
politici." (Italian translation of English text) Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 128.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing problem posed by
treaties when they conflict with constitutional principles).
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Court of Cassation's decision in In re Gomez Ces. 158 Mr. Gomez
Ces, a member of the Spanish Basque terrorist group ETA,
shot two Spanish policemen, murdering one and injuring the
other and an innocent passerby in the process.' 5 9 Upon discovering that Mr. Gomez Ces was in Italy, the Spanish government formally requested his arrest and extradition.' 60 The accused claimed that his act was political and that pursuant to
Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code and Articles 10 and 26 of
16
the Constitution, he was exempt from extradition.
The Court of Cassation rejected his claim, holding that
Mr. Gomez Ces' acts did not constitute a political offense. 62
In rendering its decision, the Court viewed such acts in light of
prevailing international notions incorporated in the various
treaties that Italy had ratified condemning acts aimed at innocent civilians. 163 The Court stressed that with the evolution of
international conventions on terrorism, the traditional limits
on the political offense exception had multiplied. 64 The
Court cited the international movement to limit political offenses as evidence that the subjective notion of political crimes
could not be resolved exclusively by referring to Article 8 of
the Italian Penal Code.' 65 The Court concluded that the grav158. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1989, Corte di Cassazione II, Sez. I Penale (c.c. 2/
27/89, Sentence No. 499), in Gius. Pen. at 394 (1990).
159. Id. The crimes for which he is sought include homicide, attempted murder, kidnapping and illegal weapons possession. Id.
160. Id. at 395.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The various pertinent treaties the Court refers to include the European
Extradition Treaty of 1957, the Extradition Treaty with Spain, and the Strasbourg
Convention of 1977. Id. at 337. The court established a new approach for assessing
the political nature of a crime, stating that in an extradition request, the subjective
notion of Article 8 must be integrated with the principles set forth in paragraph one
of Article 10 of the Constitution through which Italian law must conform to generally
accepted international principles; the overall disposition of the Constitution to protect human values; the specific discipline of international treaties and conventions
ratified by Italy which seek to limit the broad aspects of the political offense provision; and Article 13 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
which mitigates the subjective criteria of political offenses by focusing on the gravity
of objective factors such as the harm posed to the life, physical integrity, and individual freedom of persons. Id.
164. Id. at 400. "L'evoluzione ... di quest'ultima normativa [il diritto internazionale] dimostra che si sono moltiplicate le clausole tradizionalmente derogative di
estradizione per reati politici." (Italian translation of English text) Id.
165. Id. The various clauses that have sought to de-politicize the political of-
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ity of Mr. Gomez Ces' acts fell within the parameters of Article
13 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 166

In In re Van Anraat,167 the Supreme Court of Cassation
modified the guidelines established in Gomez Ces to further

weaken the application of the political offense provision of Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code. 68 Frans Van Anraat, a Dutch
national, was indicted in the United States for unlawfully ex70
porting thiodiglycol t6 9 from the United States to Jordan.1

The United States filed a request for his extradition, but the
Court of Appeals of Milan denied it on the grounds that the
United States was inspired by political motives for requesting
Mr. Van Anraat's surrender.'17 On appeal before the Court of
fense exception, such as the Belgian attentat clause and the Swiss proportionality test,
are, the Court noted, "unequivocal evidence" that a subjective political offense cannot be assessed solely by referring to Article 8. Id.
166. Id. at 400-01.
167. Judgment ofJanuary 23, 1990, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale (c.c. December 15, 1989, Sentence No. 3329).
168. Id.
169. See Judgment of July 19, 1989, Corte di appello di Milano, Sez. Istruttoria
at 1. Thiodiglycol, a product usually used in the textile industries, can also be used
as a chemical precursor for the production of Yprite (mustard gas). Id.
170. Judgment ofJuly 19, 1989 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di appello, Sez. Istruttoria at 1. The exportation of thiodiglycol requires a special license by the U.S. government for any countries not allied with the United States. Id. Thiodiglycol cannot
be exported to Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Id. The United States issued these regulations
in response to evidence that Iran and Iraq were using mustard gas in their war. Supplemental Affidavit for U.S. Government at 4, United States of America v. Frans Van
Anraat, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale No. 3329 (1989) [hereinafter U.S. Supplemental Affidavit.]. The violation is punishable by U.S. laws under 50 U.S.C. App.
2410(B), 15 C.F.R. 372.1, 374.1, 387.2, 387.6, 399.1 and 18 U.S.C. 2. Judgment of
July 19, 1989 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di appello, Sez. Istruttoria at 1. Van Anraat
was also charged for making false statements to U.S. Government Agencies. U.S.
Supplemental Affidavit, supra, at 7. Under the regulations created to control the export of thiodiglycol, a fundamental requirement is that exporters will furnish the government with information to monitor the chemical's destination. Id. at 7. Exporters
must apply for a license and specify the ultimate destination of the product. Id. The
regulations prohibit the reexport of the product to any destination contrary to the
one specified in the agreement made with the United States. To do otherwise would
undermine the very purpose of the law. Id. In the present case, Mr. Van Anraat
informed government officials the product's destination was in Western Europe. Id.
He, however, re-exported the product tojordan. Id. For making false statements, he
is also charged with deceiving U.S. officials. Id. at 5-6.
171. Judgment of July 19, 1989 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di appello di Milano,
Sez. Istruttoria at 2.' The court held that foreign politics inspired the U.S. government to prevent the exportation of thiodiglycol to Iran or Iraq and added that be-

1992-1993]

IN RE EXTRADITION OF AL-JA WARY

1291

Cassation, the Italian Court reversed, holding that the U.S.
purpose for requesting Mr. Van Anraat's extradition was not
politically motivated.' 7 2 The Court noted that politics did not
motivate the United States to prohibit the exportation of the
chemical component to potential recipients such as Iran or
Iraq, nations with which the United States did not enjoy harmonious relations.'
Instead, the Court reasoned that the
United States request expressly intended to prohibit the trans74
fer of deadly instruments to warfaring nations.
The Court added that when judging criminal activities, the
political nature of a crime cannot be assessed according to the
provisions set forth in Article 8 of the Penal Code due to the
inherent conflicting goals of the Penal Code and the constitutional provisions. 75 The Court concluded that extradition will
cause "this violation is strictly a political violation [whose] aim is to fulfill ideological
differences and different political conceptions," extradition must denied. Id.
172. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I
Penale (c.c. Dec. 15, 1989) Sentence No. 3329 at 8-9.
173. IM
174. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I
Penale (c.c. Dec. 15, 1989) Sentence No. 3329, at 9. The decision is consistent with
the broad consensus in the international community that chemical weapons are barbaric and should be eradicated. U.S. Supplemental Affidavit, supra note 170, at 3. See
Treaty on Gas Warfare, June 17, 1925, T.I.A.S. No. 8061. The decision also reinforces the purpose for which Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Italian Constitution was
adopted. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing how purpose of Article 10 of Constitution was to conform Italian law to international principles in order
to integrate state into international community and thus avoid possibility of another
war).
175. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I
Penale (c.c. Dec. 15, 1989) Sentence No. 3329, at 6. The court discusses the various
approaches proposed by legal scholars for dealing with the political offense provision
in Italian law. Id.; see supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches posed by legal writers). The court stresses that the political offense doctrine is designed to serve two different goals in Article 8 of the Penal Code and Articles 10 and 26 of the Constitution. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990 (In re Van Anraat),
Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale, Sentence No. 3329, at 6. In the Penal Code, the
political offense doctrine serves a repressive function. Id. The framers intended to
expand the definition so that such crimes could be repressed more easily. Id. This
interpretation coincides with the Fascist ideology that the state is all powerful. See
supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing goal sought to be achieved by
fascists in expanding scope of political offenses). In the Constitution, however, the
provision serves to guarantee certain rights within the limits set forth in the Constitution. Van Anraat, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale No. 3329, at 6. The rights referred to include the right to protect persons from being extradited without recognition of the inherent protections provided for in the Constitution (e.g. right of asylum). Id. The two definitions cannot be reconciled, as the former seeks to repress

1292 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1253
be barred under the constitutional provisions of the political
offense doctrine only when the accused opposes an illiberal re-

gime, affirms a fundamental right guaranteed in the Italian
Constitution, or proves that political purposes motivate a nation's extradition request. 1 76 The decision was premised on
the fundamental principles established in Musbach and reflects

the Court's willingness to adhere to preceding cases that have
gradually diminished the political offense doctrine in Italian jurisprudence.
D. United States-Italy Extradition Treaty
In 1983, the United States and Italy entered into a bilateral extradition treaty to replace the former agreement that
had been in effect since 1975.177 Through Article V of the new
extradition treaty, the signatories sought to adopt a single approach to the political offense doctrine. 7 8 Article V of the
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty prohibits extradition for political
offenses, but fails to define a political offense. 1 79 As a result,
domestic codes and internal criminal procedure dictate which
crimes can be characterized as political offenses.'8 0 The respective approaches utilized by each country for assessing a
the political offense doctrine in an effort to expand state power, while the latter does
exactly the opposite, seeking to limit the punitive power of foreign states. Id. In
effect, the constitutional provisions serve one essential purpose: to prevent the Italian State from collaborating and thus making it possible for a foreign state to request
one's extradition solely for political purposes. Id. at 7.
176. Judgment of Jan.' 23, 1990 (In re Van Anraat), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I
Penale (c.c. December 15, 1989) Sentence No. 3329, at 8.
177. GIULIO CATELANI & DANIELE STRIANI, L'ESTRADIZIONE, APPENDICE DI AGGIORNAMENTO 3 (1987).
178. Article V, 2 of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, 24 I.L.M.
at 1528, provides:
For the purpose of the application of paragraph 1 of this Article, an offense
with respect to which both Contracting Parties have the obligation to submit
for prosecution ... or any attempt to commit such an offense, will be presumed to have the predominate character of a common crime when its consequences were or could have been grave. In determining the gravity of the
offense and its consequences, the fact that the offense endangered public
safety, harmed persons unrelated to the political purpose of the offender, or
was committed with ruthlessness shall, in particular, be taken into account.
Id.
179. See Art. V, 1 of U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, 24 I.L.M. at
1528.
180. See CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing
how extradition decision ultimately rests with judiciary of requested state).
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political offense, however, conflict, thus inhibiting both nations
from achieving a uniform definition of political crimes."18 In
an effort to secure that Italy would not categorize terrorist
crimes as political offenses, the United States sought reassurances from Italy that terrorist crimes would be precluded from
political offense consideration if they were directed against innocent civilians.'8 2 Italy assured the United States that terrorist crimes would not be considered political offenses if they
were directed against a party withdrawn from the political conflict.' 3
Despite the assurances, the fact that both nations utilize
divergent approaches for assessing a political crime jeopardizes the principle of reciprocity set forth in Article II of the
extradition treaty.' 8 4 Article II, paragraph 1 provides that an
offense shall be extraditable if it is punishable under the laws
of both countries.' 8 5 Thus, under the principle of reciprocity,
if either the United States or Italy requests an individual's extradition from the other contracting party and the crime for
which the accused is sought is punishable by the laws of both
nations, there is a duty to extradite. 8 6 A problem arises, however, if the individual sought commits a crime that is punishable under the laws of both countries, but the accused alleges
it is a political offense and subject to the protection afforded by
the political offense exception. The rules adopted by both the
United States and Italy governing the political offense status of
a crime differ.' 8 7 Therefore, although an offense may be punishable under the laws of both countries and subject to extradition, one party to the treaty may apply domestic interpretations of the political offense doctrine to declare that an offense
is not extraditable.'18 In such a scenario, one country could
refuse to extradite an individual solely because it characterizes
181. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing how approaches
utilized by U.S. and Italian courts regarding political offense vary).
182. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 3-4.
183. Id.
184. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. II, 1, 24 I.L.M. at 1527.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing divergent approaches to political offense exception utilized by both United States and Italy).
188. See SWEENEY, supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing French refusal of U.S. extradition request).
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the offense as political. 8 9 Refusing to extradite an individual
on these grounds would amount to a derogation of that nation's duty under the principle of reciprocity.
II. THE EXTRADITION OF
KHALED MOHAMMED EL JASSEM

In In re AI-Jawary, the petitioner, Mohammed El Jassem,
alias Al-Jawary, an Iraqi national arrested in Rome, Italy in January 1991, challenged a decision by the Rome Court of Appeals granting his extradition to the United States for the attempted bombing of various Israeli targets in New York City in
1973.190 Al-Jawary's attorneys alleged that the act was political
in nature, and thus pursuant to Article 8 of the Italian Penal
Code and Article V of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty,'' exempted their client from extradition.' 92 The Italian Court of
Cassation rendered a decision premised on the prevailing notions of international law that seek to weaken application of the
political offense exception to terrorist crimes.' 93
A. Factual and ProceduralBackground

Early in January 1991, Italian border police detained AlJawary at Rome's Fiumicino airport upon suspicion that he was
travelling with a false passport.' 94 Subsequent investigations
linked the Iraqi national to an individual being sought by U.S.
authorities for a bombing campaign in New York in 1973.'9'

In March 1973, New York City Police Department officials discovered two bombs inside two separate rental cars that had
189. Id.
190. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 1.
191. Id. at 11-12. See Article V, 1 of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra
note 11, 24 I.L.M. at 1528.
192. Id.
193. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 1.
194. "US Confident of Extraditing Wanted Iraqi from Italy," REUTERS, Jan. 24,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File [hereinafter REUTERS]. Italian
security sources said U.S. officials in Athens had spotted AI-Jawary boarding a plane.
AI-Jawary was on his way to Tunis the day before the Gulf War erupted when he was
apprehended. Id. Upon his detention, Italian officials charged Al-Jawary with travelling with false identification. Id.
195. REUTERS, supra note 194. Al-Jawary had been on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's [hereinafter FBI] most wanted list for 18 years. Id.
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been towed away from New York City streets.' 9 6 Parking tickets revealed both cars had been parked directly in the vicinity
of two Israeli banks.1 9 7 FBI Special Agents were notified and a
third rental vehicle containing yet another explosive device
was discovered in front of the El-Al Israeli Air Cargo Terminal
at John F. Kennedy Airport.' 9 None of the devices exploded,
apparently due to faulty fuses.' 99 Evidence obtained from each

of the cars revealed that all three devices were similar in construction, and a subsequent investigation linked the three vehi-

cles to Al-Jawary, an Iraqi citizen allegedly associated with the
Black September terrorist group. 2 °
Upon discovering that the Italian police had captured AlJawary, the U.S. government, pursuant to Article X of the U.S.Italy Extradition Treaty, 20 ' requested that Al-Jawary be detained on the strength of two arrest warrants issued by the judicial authorities of the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
York.2 °2 Italian police detained the petitioner for questioning2 0 3 while U.S. officials forwarded fingerprints to Italy to
196. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, sentence No. 767, at 3-5.
197. Id. at 3-4.
198. Id. at 5.
199. Id. at 4.
200. "Iraqi Denies Planting Bombs," JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 22, 1992; see Brief
for Appellant at 5, Gian Antonio Minghelli (1991), Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992, Sez.
Penale I/a, Sentence No. 767 [hereinafter Minghelli Brief].
201. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. X, 24 I.L.M. at 1528. Article X, 3 provides that requests for extradition relating to persons not yet convicted
shall be made through diplomatic channels and shall be accompanied by a certified
copy of the arrest warrant. Id.
202. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di appello di Roma, Sez.
4/a Pen., Sentence No. 1/91, at 2. The arrest warrants were issued subsequent to
indictments filed in both the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. Id. The
indictment in the Eastern District charged Khalid Duhhan Al-Jawary with attempting
to damage or destroy the El Al Israeli Airlines cargo facility at John F. Kennedy Airport via an explosive device in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. 844(i). U.S. Government
Affidavit at 2, United States of America v. John Doe, a/k/a Khalid Duhhan AI-Jawary,
Criminal Docket No. 73-0500, E.D.N.Y., February 4, 1991. The indictment in the
Southern District of New York charged Khalid Duhhan AI-Jawary with attempting to
damage or destroy two Israeli banks located in Manhattan via an explosive device.
See U.S. Government Affidavit at 2, United States of America v. John Doe, a/k/a
Khalid Duhhan AI-Jawary, Criminal Docket No. 73-CR-481, S.D.N.Y., February
1991.
203. Minghelli Brief, supra note 200, at 6-7. A dispute exists as to whether AlJawary was arrested immediately upon his arrival, or upon completion of his questioning. Id. Notwithstanding the dispute, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Ap-
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identify the detainee. 20 4 By February, the United States had
provided all the documentation requested by the Italian authorities. 0 5 One month later, Italian officials submitted an
analysis of the fingerprints to the Italian Prosecutor General.20 6 The analysts concluded that three of the seven partial
fingerprints transmitted by the United States were identical to
the fingerprints of Al-Jawary.2 °7 In April, the Italian Ministry
ofJustice requested the Prosecutor General to submit both the
indictment and other documentation forwarded by the United
States to the Italian Court of Appeals. 20 8 The Prosecutor Gen-

eral,20 9 on the basis of information submitted by the United

States, concluded that the extradition request should be
granted.21 0
The Court of Appeals examined the merit of the extradition request to ascertain whether the pertinent evidence and

the conclusions reached by the Prosecutor General furnished a
reasonable basis for extraditing Al-Jawary to the United
States. 21 The court focused on assessing the political nature
of Al-Jawary's act and cited recent developments in Italian jurisprudence mandating that the definition of a political crime
peals validated the petitioner's arrest by an order for investigative detention and informed the Italian Ministry of Grace and Justice of its decision. Judgment of May 21,
1991 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di appello di Roma, Sez. 4/a Pen., Sentence No. 1/91,
at 2.
204. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di appello di Roma, Sez.
Pen. IV, Sentence No. 1/91, at 2. Fingerprints taken from various items of the alleged perpetrator of the bombings in 1973 (rental cars, newspapers, and hotel room
where devices were constructed) were compared to those of the detainee in Rome in
order to identify him and assure that the individual arrested in Rome was the same
person being sought for the bombings in New York. Id.
205. Id. at 3. These documents included photographs and fingerprints of the
person sought; affidavits indicating facts of the crimes; texts of the laws which describe the essential elements and definition of the crimes; texts of the laws which
regulate the prosecution of such crimes. Id. The documentation forwarded complied with Article X,
2-3 of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. X, 24 I.L.M. at 1528.
206. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di appello di Roma, Sez.
Pen IV, Sentence No. 1/91, at 5.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id. at 3-4.
209. See G.L. CERTOMA, supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing framework of Italian legal system).
210. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte d' appello di Roma, Sez.
Pen. IV, Sentence No. 1/91, at 3-4.
211. Id. at9.
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cannot be applied solely by consideration of Article 8 of the
Penal Code.21 2 The court then proceeded with an analysis of
Article V of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty. 21 ' The court
found that the subjectivist criterion contained in Article 8 of
the Penal Code needed to be balanced against the treaty provi214
sions of Article V to assess the political nature of a crime.
Applying this standard, the court concluded that placing
three cars filled with explosives in crowded locations provided
sufficient reason to hold that the crimes committed constituted
a danger to the life and safety of innocent people. 21 5- As the
court reasoned, the bombs, had they detonated, would have
harmed persons unrelated to the perpetrator's political purpose. 1 6 The court declared that these facts constituted sufficient grounds for granting Al-Jawary's extradition to the
212. Id. at 16. The court noted that traditionally, to define a subjective political
offense, the courts were obliged to refer to Article 8 of the Penal Code. Id. at 15.
Extensive doctrinal and jurisprudential debates modified this approach, holding that
if a common crime was to be regarded as subjectively political, the crime had to be
qualified by a strictly and exclusively political motive. Id.; see supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that common crime will be considered subjectively political
if perpetrator was moved to commit offense in order to be able to influence through
his action existence, constitution, and functioning of State, or to promote or state
ideas, and political, social, or religious trends for principal purpose of realizing political idea). The Court of Appeals cited Gomez and emphasized that in recent years this
approach has been limited. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di
appello di Roma, Sez. Pen. IV, Sentence No. 1/91, at 16.
213. See supra notes 178 and accompanying text (outlining text of Article V, $ 2).
214. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di appello di Roma, Sez.
Pen. IV, Sentence No. 1/91, at 17.
215. Id. at 17-18.
216. Id. The court observed that even though the political motives of the offender were only claimed by defense counsel, and not by AI-Jawary who had always
declared that he had nothing to do with the crime he had been charged with, the
characteristics of gravity established in Article V had been satisfied. Id. at 17. AlJawary did, however, declare that he was a member of the PLO. Id. at 18. In AlJawary, defense counsel claimed a political motive existed, despite defendant's declarations that he had nothing to do with the crimes he was charged with. Id. at 17. The
court stressed, however, that even if a political motive was ascribed, which would be
hypothetically connected with the well-known conflict between Arabs and Israelis,
the gravity of the offense would prevent the act from being elevated to a political
offense. Id. U.S. investigators, simulating the effects of the bombs had they detonated, estimated that all persons who happened to be within 100 yards of the explosion would have been killed. Id. at 17-18; see supra note 147 and accompanying text
(discussing holding by French Cour d'Appel in Piperno where court noted that despite
political aspect of crime, gravity of harm precluded act from constituting political
offense).
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United States. 2 7 Al-Jawary appealed the decision to the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation.21 8
B. The Judgment of the Court of Cassation and the Opinion of
Presidente Corrado Carnevale
The Court of Cassation (the "Court") considered whether
Al-Jawary's act constituted a political offense under Italian jurisprudence and would thus bar his extradition by virtue of the
political offense provision of the U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty.2 "9 The Court adopted a new totality of the circumstances test, balancing safeguards incorporated in the Italian
Constitution to prevent the extradition of political offenders. 2 2 The Court, however, ultimately weighed these aspects
in relation to international principles on the subject of terrorist
crimes and the gravity of the offense. 22 ' The Court affirmed
Al-Jawary's extradition and held that under Article 10 of the
Italian Constitution 2 22 and prevailing jurisprudence governing
application of the political offense doctrine to terrorist crimes,
Al-Jawary's attempted bombing did not constitute a political
offense. 2
The Court of Cassation confronted two central issues in
rendering its decision.2 2 4 The first issue involved the applicability of Article V, paragraph two of the U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty.2 25 The second issue focused on an analysis of Italy's
interpretation of the political offense doctrine. 2 6 Concerning
the applicability of Article V, the U.S. Department of Justice
("Justice Department") argued that Al-Jawary's act violated a
217. Judgment of May 21, 1991 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di appello di Roma, Sez.
Pen. IV, Sentence No. 1/91, at 19.
218. Id.
219. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 12.
220. Id. at 1.
221. Id. at 17.
222. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing how Italian law must
conform to generally recognized principles of international law).
223. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1991 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 17.
224. Id. at 12.
225. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (defining Art. V, 2 of Treaty).
226. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1991 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 14-17.
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multilateral international agreement binding both nations.2 2 7
The Justice Department submitted evidence indicating that if
the explosive planted before the El-Al air terminal had detonated, the potential impact would have damaged incoming aircraft and injured innocent civilians. 2 28 The U.S government

thus sought to place Al-Jawary's attempted bombing within the
scope of the 1971 Montreal Convention Against the Sabotage
of Aircraft (the "Montreal Convention").2 29 Assessing the evidence, the Court acknowledged that the bomb's location

would have put numerous passengers using the terminal at serious risk of death or injury. 230 The Court, however, dismissed
the U.S. government's contention that the Montreal Convention was applicable due to the inconsistencies inherent in the
2
evidence. 3'
227. Id. at 13.
228. Id. at 13-14. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted a series
of tests in an effort to simulate the situation atJFK Airport. Id. FBI experts placed a
bomb identical to the one discovered at the scene in an automobile similar to the one
parked adjacent to the El-Al air terminal. Id. The bomb was detonated, producing
"fragmentation of the automobile and its contents, sound and thermal waves, as well
as a fireball that rose approximately 100 to 150 feet" into the air. Id. at 13-14. The
experts concluded that such an explosion would have endangered incoming aircraft
using approach" 13L" and others that were traveling at an altitude of 300 to 500 feet.
Id. at 14.
229. Montreal Convention, supra note 2, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570. The
Convention has been ratified by both the United States and Italy. Id. Article 1 of the
Convention provides that "Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and intentionally: (d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger its safety in flight .... " Id. Article 7
provides that [t]he contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever
and whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." Id.
230. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 13. "Secondo l'affidavit, al momento del mancato attentato una
parte dell'aerostazione era a disposizione dei passeggeri della El-Al e quindi la posizione della bomba mise in pericolo di morte o di ferimento numerosi passeggeri."
Id. The conclusions reached by FBI experts following the tests that they conducted
provided conclusive evidence of the gravity of the crime. Id. at 16.
231. Id. at 14. The evidence revealed that the explosion would have created a
fireball rising to 150 feet in the air. Id. Additional evidence purported to show that
airlines travelling at an altitude of 300 to 500 feet would have been placed in jeopardy, more than twice the height of the fireball. Id. The court felt the discrepancy
was cause for questioning the validity of the evidence. Id. In addition, even if the
evidence were accepted, the Montreal Convention could only be applied for the
crime committed atJFK Airport, and not the other two attempted bombings in Manhattan. Id.
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The Court then turned to an analysis of Italy's political
offense exception.2 3 2 Reiterating its holding in Gomez Ces, the
Court of Cassation held that the political offense exception in
Italian jurisprudence must be defined in terms of the provisions of the Constitution that protect the values of the human
being, Article 10 of the Constitution, and the discipline of the

conventions and treaties that Italy has signed and ratified.

33

Judge Corrado Carnevale recalled the legislative history of the
political offense exception and stressed that Article 8 of the
Penal Code and Articles 10 and 26 of the Constitution were

inspired by different legislative goals.234 Judge Carnevale further noted that Italian jurists adopted various approaches in
preceding years to reconcile Article 8 of the Penal Code and
the relevant Constitutional provisions. 2 35 Recent international

developments, however, established that the definition of a
political crime could no longer be derived solely by referring
232. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 15-17.
233. Id. at 15. "[A]i fini estradizionali, occorre muovere, come giA osservato
nella citata sentenza in ricorso Gomez, dalla considerazione dei valori umani primari
e irrinunciabili consacrati nella costituzione; dalla disposizione dell' Art. 10 comma 1
della stessa... e dall' evoluzione della normativa internazionale... in materia." Id.
(Italian translation of English text). One significant obstacle confronting the court
was the fact that no single treaty limiting the political offense exception ratified by
both Italy and the United States was applicable in the present scenario. Id. In Gomez,
the court relied on the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism which
both Italy and Spain had ratified to extradite a Spanish terrorist. Judgment of March
30, 1989 (In re Gomez Ces), Corte di Cassazione, Gius. Pen. II, at 335. In Van Anraat,
Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale, Sentence No. 3329,
the Geneva Convention Against the Use of Chemical Weapons, as well as general
recognized principles of international law, were binding upon the United States and
Italy. Id. at 1. In AI-Jawary, however, the Court of Cassation dismissed the Montreal
Convention, thereby precluding the Court from adopting an analysis premised on an
international convention which confined Italy to extradite AI-Jawary. Judgment of
Feb. 17, 1992 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen. I/a, No. 767, at 13-14.
234. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 14-15. "Vi 6 intanto un' evidente visuale diversa del problema che
ispira i due testi legislativi, la quale nasce dalla diversa concezione politica che ad essi
6 sottesa, essendo ben noto l'intento repressivo al pi6 ampio raggio che muoveva il
regime nel quale l'art. 8 del cp. fu approvato." Id.
235. Id. at 15. See CATELANI & STRIANI supra note 12, at 199 (noting that some

legal writers mistakenly concluded that Article 8 of Penal Code should have been
constitutionalized). As Judge Carnevale makes clear, objections were raised against
constitutionalizing Article 8. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (observing
that constitutional provisions should serve as guide for ordinary law, and not vice
versa).
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to Article 8 of the Penal Code.2" 6 Judge Carnevale confirmed
juridical interpretations that constitutional provisions should
serve as a guide for ordinary laws, and not vice versa.23 7 The
decision thereby eliminated the traditional practice of referring to Article 8 of the Penal Code to define a political offense.23 8 Departing from the traditional approach of defining
political crimes., the Court of Cassation adopted a new test to
assess whether Al-Jawary's attempted bombing constituted a
political offense.2 3 9 The Court emphasized the difficulty of devising a single definition of a political offense. 24 0 The tendency
in international law to diffuse the political offense exception, 2 4'
however, reflected the necessity to protect human values
against grave transgressions resulting from politically inspired
crimes.242 A political offense, therefore, must be defined by
236. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 14. "Non 6 possibile ricostruire la nozione di reato politico alla
stregua dell'art. 8 del vigente cod. pen., usando questo come esclusivo strumento di
lettura del senso di reato politico del quale pure parlano le disposizioni degli art. 10
ultimo comma e 26 ultimo comma della costituzione." Id. (Italian translation of
English text).
237. Id. at 15.
238. Id. "[S]uccessivamente 6 emersa e si 6 fatta strada l'obiezione - che qui
appare condivisibile e decisiva - che una tale opinione finiva per obliterare il
principio che sono i concetti della costituzione che devono servire da misura per la
lettura delle norme ordinarie e non viceversa." Id. (Subsequently, an objection has
emerged, which here appears conclusive, that constitutional provisions should serve
as a guide for ordinary laws, and not vice versa) (translation by Comment Author).
239. Id. at 16-17.
240. Id.at 15. "Ancora 6 aiduo per la veriti cogliere una definizione del delitto
politico..." (Italian translation of English text) Id. See SCHAFER, supra note 38 (discussing how all crimes may be considered political).
241. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 15-16. This tendency is'reflected in the Belgian attentat clause of
Article 3, 3 of the European Convention on Extradition; the European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 136; the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 2; and the Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note
2. Though the court dismissed the U.S. Government's contention that the Montreal
Convention was applicable in the present case, the court agreed that the Convention
was evidence of an international consensus to limit the political offense exception.
Id. at 16.

242. Id. at 16. "In tale evoluzione della normativa internazionale non pu6 non
apparire evidente come, non tanto la nozione in s6 del reato politico, quanto la sua
rilevanza ai fini estradizionali sia stata contemporata con la necessit6 di tutelare
primari valori umani universali, gravemente offesi da delitti di ispirazione politica."
Id. (Italian translation of English text). The gravity of these offenses, the court

noted, would be assessed within the parameters set by Article 13 of the Strasbourg
Convention.

Id. These principles coincide with the elements Italy maintained it
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balancing various ideals embodied in the Italian Constitution
in order to protect the principles set forth therein from serious
aggressive acts committed by individuals.2 43
Applying this new totality of the circumstances approach
to the present case, the Court rejected Al-Jawary's defense that
he did not intend to injure anyone because neither of the three
car bombs exploded.2 4 4 The Court reasoned that the explosive devices, had they detonated, would have killed numerous
persons unrelated to Al-Jawary's political objective of overthrowing the State of Israel.2 4 5 AI-Jawary's failed attempt
therefore violated fundamental human values and assumed the
decisive characteristics necessary to exclude the act from political offense consideration.2 4 6
Assessing the nature of a political crime by balancing the
various elements enumerated in the decision, Judge Carnevale
concluded that Al-Jawary should be extradited to the United
would honor in its reservation to the Convention when assessing the political nature
of a crime. Id. "Questi aspetti della gravitA dei reati sono quelli stessi che lo Stato
italiano . . . si 6 impegnato a considerare prima di pervenire al rifiuto
dell'estradizione motivata dal carattere politico del reato." Id. (The grave aspects of
a crime are the same characteristics that Italy ... reserved the right to assess [in the
Strasbourg Convention] before refusing to extradite political offenders) (translation
by Comment Author).
243. Id. at 16-17. The court noted
Con ci6 si ritiene di poter concludere nel senso che ia nozione di delitto
politico, ai fini estradizionali, trova la sua definizione nel bilanciamento tra il
valore insito nel principio costituzionale del rifiuto di consentire alla persecuzione del cittadino e dello straniero per motivi politici, e quello di tutela
dei valori primari umani - pur consacrati nella carta costituzionale - quando
i'aggressione ad essi abbia quei caratteri di graviti individuabili alla stregua
dei parametri su ricordati.
Id. (Italian translation of English text).
The principles inherent in the Italian Constitution which the Court refers to
include the refusal to extradite foreigners or citizens for political motives (Art. 10
and 26); and the protection of human values (life, physical integrity). Id.
244. Id. at 17.
245. Id. As a member of the Black September Organization, Al-Jawary's political objective was never expressed, but may be linked to the organization's declared
objective of overthrowing the State of Israel. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 11-12.
246. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 11-12. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270,
275 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing that political offense exception "does not afford
a haven for persons who commit the most heinous atrocities for political ends"). The
court in Doherty explicitly stated that acts that "transcend the limits of international
law" and are "inconsistent with international standards of civilized conduct" will not
be protected under the guise of the political offense exception. Id. at 274-75.
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States. 247 The Court deferred the final decision to the Italian
Minister of Grace and Justice Claudio Martelli.2 4s Minister

Martelli reviewed the Court of Cassation's analysis and confirmed the Court's finding, thus completing the formal process
for extraditing Al-Jawary to the United States.249
III. THE AL-JA WARY DECISION PROVIDES A NEW
INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
PROVISION OF THE U.S.-ITALY EXTRADITION TREATY
AND STRENG THENS U.S. -ITALIAN EFFORTS TO COMBAT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The Court of Cassation decision in AI-Jawary is significant
for two distinct reasons. First, the Italian Court utilized a new
approach to the political offense provision, adopting international norms as law rather than relying on the Italian Penal
Code.2

50

Although the decision seems to undermine Italian

domestic law in favor of international law, a review of the Italian Constitution and current interpretations of the political offense provision shows that the decision was proper and upholds general principles of international law. 25 1 Second, the
new approach parallels prevailing U.S. jurisprudence governing application of the political offense provision to terrorist
crimes and demonstrates that adherence by the United States
to the legal channels instituted to combat terrorism is an effective way to prosecute international terrorists.
A. The Immediate Effect of In re Al-Jawary
Al-Jawary represents the culmination of a series of decisions over the past decade that has permitted Italian courts to
depart from the traditional approach of defining a political of247. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 15.
248. See La Partecipazione Del Ministro Al Procedimento di Estradizione, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA, Sez. III, Diritto Internazionale, supra note 140, at 2-3 (discuss-

ing role of Minister of Grace and Justice in extradition proceedings, including authority to negate decision of Court of Cassation).
249. Id.
250. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 15-17.
251. Seesupra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Article 10
of Italian Constitution).
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fense.252 The decision aids the ultimate development of a narrower interpretation of the political offense exception previously in effect in Italy. 3 The legislatures that devised the Italian Penal Code sought to repress political activism in an effort
to secure state interests. 5 4 The subjective elements of the
political offense exception were incorporated in the Penal
Code to facilitate adjudication of a common crime to political
offense status. 5 5 Inclusion of these elements in the code was
designed to preserve fascist ideology. 2 56 The fascist era definition of political offenses has proven incompatible with prevailing international jurisprudence that has sought to restrict the
meaning of political offenses in light of increased terrorist activities. 5 7
The current international movement to narrow the broad
scope of the political offense doctrine is designed to prevent
terrorists who engage in ruthless acts directed against innocent
civilians 2 58 from escaping prosecution. 2 59 Indeed, the political
252. See In re Musbach, Judgment of Jan. 14, 1982, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro
It. II at 125, In re Gomez,Judgment of Mar. 30, 1989, Corte di Cassazione II, in Gius.
Pen. II at 335 (1990), In re Van Anraat, Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale, Sentence No. 3329.
253. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing broad expansion
of political offenses via Article 8 of Italian Penal Code).
254. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Article 8 of Penal Code of 1930).
255. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 216-17. The legislative history of
Article 8 of the Penal Code reveals that subjectively motivated offenses were considered political crimes because the goal of the perpetrator was to offend political interests of the State. Id. To protect the collective interest of the State, the drafters of the
Penal Code recognized that these acts needed to be repressed. Id. Thus, Article 8
really served a narrow purpose. Id. The Italian courts in adopting Article 8 to define
political offenses appear to have misconstrued the article's purpose, expanding the
definition in a way never really contemplated by the drafters. Id. at 216; see, e.g., In re
Koronakis, supra note 121 and accompanying text (describing how Italian government
granted Greece's extradition request for Greek national who attempted to destroy
Greek Ministry of Justice by placing time bomb near building). In Al-Jawary, the
Court of Cassation notes that this definition has been curtailed by recent jurisprudence. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen. I/
a, No. 767, at 15.
256. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 216-17.

257. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (describing various conventions
limiting political offense exception).
258. See Time's Labor Lost, METROPOLITAN, June 2, 1992, at 14 (describing

machine gun attack by Palestinian terrorists at Rome's Fiumicino Airport which killed
innocent travelers including 10-year old Natasha Simpson); see also Extradition Hearing, supra note 49, at 47 n.34 (describing decision by Chambre d'Accusation of
French Court of Appeals to uphold extradition of Linaza-Echevarria, reputed Basque
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offense doctrine originated in Europe to protect political dissidents from persecution in their homelands where freedom of
expression was oppressed. 2 ° In today's democratic societies,
a nation cannot tolerate individuals who revert to violence in
order to bring attention to their cause.2 6 ' More importantly,
allowing terrorists to seek protection under the guise of the
political offense doctrine undermines the very purpose for
which the principle first emerged. 62
Unlike the decisions rendered in Gomez Ces and Van Anraat,
which relied on specific provisions of international conventions
binding both Italy and the respective requesting states, the
Court of Cassation in Al-Jawary revealed that the present case
was not governed by a convention, but by principles of international law.263 The Court reasoned that the evolution of interterrorist sought by Spain for murders of alderman and six Spanish Civil Guards).
The fugitive alleged that the crimes were politically motivated, but the French court
rejected the claim on the grounds the offenses were too serious to be covered by the
non-extradition exception. Id.
259. CATELANI & STRIANI, supra note 12, at 211. As one Italian legal writer has
noted, terrorism may not be considered a political act so as to enjoy protection under
Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code because terrorism is not an activity protected by
the Italian Constitution. Id. Terrorism is a crime directed at innocent persons and,
as such, requires punishment for it violates the Italian Penal Code. Id. By analogy,
anything that violates the Penal Code also violates the Constitution, and in a democratic society, political violence cannot be tolerated. Id. at 211-12. See Sapiro, supra
note 56, at 663 (noting that those who promote political change by violent means
must remain accountable for their actions that injure rights of others).
260. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing how political offense doctrine originated).
261. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting Toensing statement that
terrorism may not be tolerated in today's democratic societies).
262. Sapiro, supra note 56, at 663. The doctrine developed to protect the lives
of political activists. Id. Terrorists, on the other hand, often engage in ruthless acts
directed primarily to injure and/or kill. Id. To extend protection to such individuals
would oppose the spirit of the political offense doctrine. Id.; see Extradition Hearing,
supra note 49, at 51 (stressing that it is "wholly unlikely that a study of 19th century
diplomatic sources would corroborate the view that the 'political offense' exception
was intended as a recognition of some absolute and unqualified 'right to rebel' ").
263. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 1; Interview with Mary Ellen Warlow, Senior Counsel for International Law Enforcement, U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of International Affairs,
Criminal Division, in Rome, Italy (July 29, 1992) [hereinafter DOJ Interview]; see In re
Gomez,Judgment of Mar. 30, 1989, Corte di Cassazione, in Gius. Pen. II at 395 (holding based on European convention binding both Italy and Spain); In re Van Anraat,
Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I Penale, Sentence No. 3329
(holding premised on both principles of Geneva Convention and on recognized view
of civilized nations that mustard gas is a lethal weapon). Van Anraat introduced the
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national conventions made it clear that the notion of a political
offense must coincide with the need to protect human values. 264 Thus, the issue of denying political offense protection
to terrorists who had committed grave serious acts emerged as
a principle of international law that now binds the Italian
courts via Article 10 of the Italian Constitution. 26 5 To comply
central argument advanced by the court in AI-Jawary that Italy is bound to adhere to

generally recognized principles of international law. DOJ Interview, supra.
The reasoning adopted by the court was espoused by Dottore Arico and cocounsel Dottore Merluzzi at oral arguments. DOJ Interview, supra. Both attorneys
were selected to represent the U.S. Department of Justice throughout the course of
the A!-Jawary proceedings. Id. According to Dott. Arico, under current European
jurisprudence, if a terrorist act is committed between nations of the European Community [hereinafter EC], European Conventions (such as Strasbourg Convention on
Terrorism of 1977) would control. Id. Thus, as made clear in Gomez, Spain and Italy
were bound to adhere to the principles set forth in the Strasbourg Convention. Id. A
problem arises, however, where one of the requesting states is not a member of the
European Community. Id. In such a case, as Al-Jawary demonstrates, applying a different standard solely on the basis of a nation's membership in a class creates a disparity. Id. Those nations that were part of the European Community would be
bound to extradite an individual who had committed acts similar to AI-Jawary, but
those that were not members would have to seek extradition on separate grounds.
Id. The absurdity of such a rule is apparent, particularly in light of the fact that the
EC is a closed class within which new members, such as the United States, cannot
enter. Id. As Dott. Merluzzi noted, applying the rule strictly would give those terrorists who committed an act outside the EC "a license to kill." Interview with Dott.
Merluzzi, Associate with Studio Legale Arico, in Rome, Italy (July 28, 1992) [hereinafter Merluzzi Interview]. To support their positions, the Italian counsel cited
Piperno, supra note 147, and the detrimental impact releasing Mr. Piperno would have
had in the event France refused to extradite the terrorist. Merluzzi Interview, supra.
The arguments presented by counsel representing the United States are consistent
with the civil law mentality among European nations that there should be conformity
with the laws. Id. In civil law countries, consistency is very important. DOJ Interview, supra. In the United States, disparate results are accepted. Id. Thus, if the
United States has a treaty with Italy, but a different one with Germany, each case
brought before a U.S. court will be dealt with differently and in accordance to the
relevant treaty. Id.
264. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (noting that human values must
be protected from grave transgressions of political offenders).
265. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Article 10
of Italian Constitution). Dott. Merluzzi noted that Art. 8 of the Penal Code is an
internal code which defines a political offense in a general fashion. Merluzzi Interview, supra note 263. The Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, provides that
international conventions will dictate what constitutes a political offense. Id. When
there is a clash between Article 8 of the Penal Code and the Italian Constitution, the
latter must govern. Merluzzi Interview, supra note 263. See BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 23, at 434 (discussing how "[o]ffenses against the Law
of Nations ...

by their very nature affect the world community .

..

[and] [a]s such,

cannot fall within the political offense exception because.., they are in derogation to
the 'laws of mankind' in general and international criminal law in particular").
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with international norms, 266 Italian courts will balance various
factors to determine what constitutes a political offense.2 6 7
The Court of Cassation therefore did not undermine the Italian Penal Code, but upheld general principles of international
law. 2 68 The Court's approach set new precedent, departing
from the traditional Italian mode of defining a political offense
and, at the same time, recognizing that the complex issue has
achieved international law status.
B. In re AI-Jawary: Conforming Italian Law to
United States Practice
The balance of circumstances approach adopted by the
Court of Cassation mirrors current U.S. practice regarding application of the political offense exception. In the United
States, courts adopt a proportionality test and examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an offense is
political.2 6 9 In Al-Jawary, the Court of Cassation similarly
chose to extradite the fugitive after analyzing various circumstances. 2 70 The Court concluded that these factors, when
viewed together, precluded the act from attaining political offense status. 2 7 ' The approach utilized by the Italian Court
266. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 56-57. The Committee on International Terrorism of the International Law Association, composed of international law scholars
and practitioners, recently declared that certain acts, regardless of political motivation, are so reprehensible that they must be suppressed. Id. at 57. The statement "is
derived from Principle I of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremburg Tribunal, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1950... [and] applies to crimes ... against humanity...." Id.
"It is suggested that the underlying principle, stated here, is applicable even more
broadly" [thus providing additional support for the prevailing international view that
grave acts should not be protected by the political offense exception]. Id.
267. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing various principles in
Italian Constitution that Italian court will seek to protect).
268. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 15.
269. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (noting that common crime
will be deemed political offense if it were committed during severe, violent political
conflict and there was direct, substantial and rational connection between offense
and that conflict); see also Piperno decision, supra note 147 and accompanying text (reflecting how Italian decision conforms to growing trend in Europe to recognize that
serious ruthless acts directed against innocent civilians will not be protected by political offense exception).
270. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen.
I/a, No. 767, at 18-19.
271. Id.
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conforms itself to United States practice on the subject.2 72
other interpretation of the political offense provision would

have violated underlying concepts of reciprocity in the U.S.Italy Extradition Treaty.2 7 3
1. U.S.-Italian Interpretation of the Political
Offense Doctrine
The Court of Cassation rejected Al-Jawary's defense that
extradition should have been denied,2 7 4 although a textual interpretation of Article V of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty
would appear to exempt the appellant from extradition.2 7 5
272. See U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 11-12. The U.S. Department of Justice
noted that
[u]nder U.S. jurisprudence, AI-Jawary would fail to establish that the offenses with which he is charged are political offenses. The asserted political
motivation of the offenses would not in itself be sufficient, and the other
circumstances that would be considered - the fact that the immediate and
overwhelmingly significant consequence of the offenses would have been
death, injury and destruction of property and not the achievement of the
Black September Organization's declared objective of overthrow of the
State of Israel; the fact that the probable victims would be innocent passersby who were completely uninvolved in the political struggle purportedly
at issue; the fact that offenses were not committed as part of any violent
political struggle against the State of Israel but rather represented the exportation of such violence to a third country - would preclude the conclusion that the relation between the asserted political objective of influencing
the resolution of a conflict between Palestinians and the State of Israel and
the extraordinarily violent yet indirect method chosen to achieve that objective represented a sufficient, rational connection to merit application of the
political offense doctrine.
Id.
273. Id. at 6. In a reciprocal situation, if Italy had requested the extradition of
an individual for similar offenses, "application of United States jurisprudence would
not prohibit extradition on the basis of the political offense doctrine." Id.
274. See Brief for Appellant, Prof. Giuseppe Gianzi, at 2-3,Judgment of Feb. 17,
1992 (In re Al-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen. I/a, No. 767 [hereinafter Gianzi
Brief]. AI-Jawary argued that extradition should have been denied due to the political motive inherent in the act. Id. In fact, defense counsel argued that although a
political motive was never asserted by the appellant, such a motive "would be hypothetically recognizable and traceable back to the well-known conflict between Arabs
and Israelis." Id. In the alternative, the "only exception to this rule would be in the
case of an offense described in paragraph 2 [of Article V] where the consequences of
the offense were or could have been grave." Id. at 8-9; U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at
2.
275. See Gianzi Brief, supra note 274, at 8-9. Al-Jawary's defense counsel argued
that a literal interpretation of Article V, 2 of the Extradition Treaty reveals that
"two types of crimes (including attempts to commit such offenses) are presumptively
non-political: (1) a grave offense directed against a Head of State or Government or
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The Court's reasoning, however, is consistent with the U.S. in-

terpretation of Article V of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty. 7 6
At the time that the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty was negotiated, the U.S. delegation 27 7 raised concerns that persons
charged with serious terrorist offenses should not be exempt
from extradition. 7 8 Italy assured the United States that violent crimes committed by terrorists would be precluded from

political offense consideration if they were directed against a
his family, or (2) a grave offense with respect to which both Parties have an obligation
under a multilateral international agreement to extradite or prosecute." See U.S.
Memo, supra note 71, at 3 n.2. As noted earlier, supra note 231, the Court dismissed
the government's contention that the Montreal Convention was applicable, thereby
foreclosing any further discussion of issue number two. Id. The present act did not
fall into the first category either. As Professor Gianzi argued,
the notion of the gravity of the consequences which the offense has caused
or could have caused in no way represents a limit of a general nature to the
principle of non-extraditability for political offenses, but represents only an
added restriction, inasmuch as it limits more specifically the range of offenses which, because of their nature, are deemed by the Treaty as exceptions to that principle.
Gianzi Brief, supra note 274, at 10.
In otherwords, defense counsel argued that paragraph two establishes two subcategories for which the gravity of the crime should be assessed, and AI-Jawary's offenses could in no way be included in the sub-categories revealed supra. Id. Thus,
by stressing the gravity of the crime, the Court has conferred to paragraph two a
power it does not have. Id. That is, the Court's interpretation "downgrades any
political offense to the level of common crime on the basis of the gravity, or lack
thereof, of the consequences it caused or that could have been caused." Id. at 11.
But see U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 3 (arguing that this interpretation is erroneous
because Article V does not preclude an examination of various circumstances which
may lead to conclusion that politically motivated offense has predominant character
of common crime rather than political one). Specifically, the U.S. argues that
simply because paragraph 2 . . . provides, for two specified categories of

offenses, particular guidance regarding certain circumstances which should
presumptively establish that the offense has the predominant characteristic of
a common crime, it does not then follow that consideration of those or any
other appropriate circumstances must necessarily be excluded with respect
to any other offenses.
Id.
276. See U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 3-4. This interpretation is premised on
the intentions of the Parties in negotiating the Treaty, as well as representations
made to the United States during treaty negotiations concerning the way in which
Article V would be applied. Id.
277. Id. at 4. Representatives MaryJo Grotenrath, Associate Director of the Office of International Affairs, and Murray Stein, Senior Counsel of the Office of International affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were instrumental in
negotiating the treaty. Id.
278. Id. at 4.

1310 FORDHAM INTERNA TIONAL L WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1253

party withdrawn from the political conflict. 2 79 Al-Jawary's act
falls within this category of offenses, despite the appellant's
contention that the bombs were not intended to detonate, because the bombs were planted in New York and were aimed at
innocent civilians not associated with the Arab-Israeli con28 0

flict.

279. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 4. The U.S. decision to revert to assurances
made during treaty negotiations is consistent with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Conference on the
Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 31 states
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty ....
8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
Article 32 provides that
[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstance of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Id. at 692.
See Kearney and Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM.J. INT'L L. 495, 518 (1970)
(noting that Foreign Offices will take into consideration preparatory work and circumstances of conclusion of treaties when faced with problems of treaty interpretations); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 82 (1985) (describing how negotiations and preparatory work are integral part
of surrounding circumstances which courts often rely on to ascertain intentions of
parties). But see International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 61
AM. J. INrr'L L. 263, 354 (1967) (discussing how Institute of International Law has
adopted textual approach whereby "le texte sign6 est, sauf de rares exceptions, la
seule et la plus rcente expression de la volont6 commune des parties") (the text is,
with rare exceptions, the only and most recent expression of the parties' common
will/intent) (translation by Comment Author). The U.S. Senate has yet to ratify the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but since 1973 the Department of State
has considered the convention as a codification of customary international law and
"as authoritative with respect to the executive's treatment of international agreements issues arising after ... 1969." SWEENEY, supra note 6, at 993-94.
280. See Gianzi Brief supra note 274, at 5-7. None of the three automobiles did
explode, a fact defense counsel argues leads to only one reasonable conclusion: the
devices had never been set to explode. Id. at 5-6. But see U.S. Memo, supra note 71,
at 11 n.9. (arguing defense presented is contrary to evidence in the case). In fact, the
investigation conducted.by the FBI revealed a
careful, painstaking plan to construct and place not one but three powerful
explosive devices, including: the use of aliases; the rental of three cars; the
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More importantly, the Official Technical Analysis (the
"Analysis") 28 ' prepared by the United States following the
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty negotiations and submitted to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to approve the
Treaty, corroborates the approach adopted by the Court of
Cassation 2 The Analysis, similar to the Court's decision to
refuse to elevate Al-Jawary's act to political offense status due
to its inherent ruthlessness, states that acts of terrorism will
not be considered political offenses.28 3 Any other approach by
the Court of Cassation would have amounted to a derogation
of Italy's obligations set forth in the Treaty. The decision thus
conforms to interpretations adopted by both parties during negotiations of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty.
The decision rendered by the Court of Cassation also satisfies the underlying principle of reciprocity in the U.S.-Italy
purchase of the components for the bomb; the movement by Al-Jawary from
one hotel room to another; the construction of the bombs in those hotel
rooms; the expert examination of one of the bombs indicating that the timing mechanism was advancing towards the time set for detonation.., and
the immediate flight of AI-Jawary from the United States once allthe bombs
had been placed.
Id.
The evidence does not suggest an "innocuous attempt to [merely] publicize the
cause of the Black September Organization" to which AI-Jawary belonged. Id. More
so, in the early 1970's, during the same period that the alleged acts occurred, "the
modus operandi of the Black September Organization was the commission of actual,
and not feigned, acts of terrorism, including assassinations, airplane hijackings, and
bombings." Id.
281. See Extradition Treaty with Italy, S. REP. No. 98-33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1984).
282. See U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 5. The Treaty Analysis provides that
[plaragraph 2 is designed to assure, to the greatest extent possible, that acts
of terrorism, particularly those covered by multilateral treaties, such as the
aircraft hijacking conventions, and those against the heads of state or government of the Parties and their families, will not be considered as political
offenses under the Treaty. It provides that terrorists and others charged or
found to have acted without regard to the physical safety of the general public cannot avoid extradition by claiming that their criminal acts were political
offenses.
Id.
The United States cites this provision as evidence that the circumstances of the
gravity of the offense and the endangerment of public safety need not only be considered within the confines of acts committed against heads of state or those covered
under certain multilateral treaties, but that consideration of the gravity of a crime
must be incorporated to "limit the applicability of the political offense doctrine to
terrorist crimes generally." Id.
283. Id.
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Extradition Treaty.28 4 Article II, paragraph 1 of the U.S.-Italy
Extradition Treaty provides that an offense shall be extraditable if it is punishable under the laws of both countries. 8 5
Thus, in a similar situation, if AI-Jawary had committed the
bombing campaign against Italian nationals and had been
brought before a U.S. magistrate to assess the political nature
of his crime subsequent to an Italian extradition request, U.S.
courts applying a totality of the circumstances approach similarly would have concluded that Al-Jawary's act was not political and therefore extraditable. 8 6 In assessing the relative
merits of whether a common crime is a political offense, U.S.
28 7
courts examine the totality of the circumstances of the case
to determine if the relation between the political purpose and
the offense is disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. 8 8
In the present scenario, assuming the acts were committed in
Italy and Al-Jawary's purported objective were linked to the
Black September Organization's declared objective of overthrowing the State of Israel, 28 9 a U.S. court would examine the
nature of the act, the context in which it was committed, and
the status of those harmed. 290 Assessing these facts, a U.S.
court would conclude that because Al-Jawary placed three
bombs in an area removed from the Arab-Israeli conflict and
directed at innocent civilians uninvolved in the political struggle at issue, the acts were not proportionate to the objective
sought.2 9 ' The analysis would conform to the growing international trend that seeks to remove acts aimed at innocent civilians from acquiring protection under the political offense
292
exception.
284. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, at art. II,
1, 24 I.L.M. at
1527.
285. Id.
286. See U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 6, 11 (noting that in reciprocal situation
U.S. court would similarly conclude Al-Jawary's act was extraditable).
287. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (outlining various factors considered by U.S. courts in assessing political nature of crime).
288. U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 9.
289. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing declared objective of
Black September Organization).
290. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing various factors enumerated by court in In re Doherty).
291. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (observing that under U.S. jurisprudence, AI-Jawary would fail to prove his act constituted political offense).
292. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (noting that common crimes
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2. In re Al-Jawaiy Reveals the Importance of Adhering to
Legal Channels in the Extradition of Terrorists
The United States encountered several obstacles in its efforts to apprehend Al-Jawary.2 93 Despite these obstacles, the
United States never resorted to irregular measures to seize AlJawary. The United States' success in the present case may be
attributed to both the U.S. and Italian officials who recognized
a need to uphold the law and strengthen future relations be29 4
tween the two nations.
will be deemed political offenses only if committed during severe, political conflict
and there is direct, substantial and rational connection between offense and that conflict).
293. Author Internship with Senior Counsel for International Enforcement,
U.S. Department ofJustice, Rome, Italy, Summer 1992. In addition to the apparent
procedural and substantive problems that the United States encountered as it sought
to deal with a foreign judiciary, language barriers, and a long-established tradition
that appeared to exempt AI-Jawary from extradition, the U.S. faced political obstacles
as well. Id. For one, as became evident in the Achille Lauro affair in 1985, Italy had
traditionally maintained good relations with the PLO, a factor which was instrumental in the Italian government's decision to permit Abu Abbas to leave Italy following a
flawless military operation conducted by the United States to apprehend the terrorist. Martin Address, supra note 3, at 531-34. Similar to the Achille Lauro case, the
United States utilized intelligence information and precise investigative techniques to
present the Italian government with a solid basis for extraditing AI-Jawary, but there
were no assurances the request would be successful. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing U.S. adherence to art. X of U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty).
Above all, AI-Jawary's successful extradition rested entirely within the hands ofJudge
Corrado Carnevale, presiding Judge of the Court of Cassation who is notorious for
releasing convicted members of the Italian mafia. See Giuseppe D'Avanzo and Giovanni Marino, Carnevale Libera Sei Ergastolani:E L'ennesima Vergogna . .. LA REPUBBLICA, Oct. 30, 1991, at 1 (describing Judge Carnevale's decision to release six mafiosi who had been sentenced by Corte d'Assise of Naples as utterly disgraceful and an
additional affront to the justice system which has seen continued release of mafiosi
brought before Judge Carnevale).
294. Author Internship with Senior Counsel for International Law Enforcement,
U.S. Department ofJustice, Rome, Italy, Summer 1992. The decision to utilize legal
channels, however, contrasts sharply with that adopted by United States officials in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). In Alvarez, governmenthired bounty hunters abducted Humberto Alvarez-Machain from his clinic in Mexico
so that he could stand trial in the United States for his alleged involvement in the
death of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar. United States v. AlvarezMachain, 112 S. Ct. 2188; see generally Abramovsky, Catch and Snatch Policy, supra
note 27, at 165-70 (describing circumstances of Camerena's kidnapping). Camerena
had been assigned to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Guadalajara, Mexico
and had infiltrated the Guadalajara drug cartel controlled by Rafael Caro-Quintero.
Abramovsky, Catch and Snatch Policy, supra note 27, at 160. In retaliation for a drug
raid conducted at Agent Camarena's urging, the DEA agent was abducted by Mexicans loyal to Caro-Quintero, tortured, and murdered. Id. A five year investigation
conducted by the DEA linked Dr. Alvarez-Machain as an accomplice to the murder.
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The Italian Court of Cassation relied on international law
Id. at 161. Because of Mexico's long-standing hostility to extradition and widespread
corruption of Mexican government officials, the DEA and Justice Department concluded that the arrest of the various members involved in the murder could not be
accomplished through extradition. Id. at 161.
Similar to the United States and Italy, Mexico and the U.S. government are parties to several bilateral agreements to combat narcotics trafficking. Abraham
Abramovsky, Transfer of Penal Sanctions: An EndangeredSpecies? 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 449, 451 (1991). These bilateral agreements include the Extradition Treaty of
1978, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty signed in 1987, and an Agreement for Cooperation and Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug Dependency in 1989. Id. at
452. Rather than utilizing the appropriate legal channels established by these agreements to apprehend criminals and request Dr. Alvarez-Machain's extradition, the
United States chose to bypass extradition procedures entirely. Alvarez, 112 S. Ct. at
2188. Mexico has formally demanded Dr. Alvarez-Machain's return and has stated
that he would be prosecuted for his offense. Id.
Though the U.S. action infringed upon Mexican sovereignty and violated international law, the U.S. Supreme Court condoned the action, holding that a criminal
defendant abducted to the United States from a nation with which the United States
has an extradition treaty does not acquire a defense to jurisdiction in U.S. courts.
Alvarez, 112 S. Ct. at 2188. According to the majority opinion, the extradition treaty
with Mexico merely "creates an optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over alleged offenders, and that the parties silently reserved the right to resort to self help
whenever they deem force more expeditious than legal process." Id. at 2199. The
decision invites all nations with whom the United States has negotiated an extradition
treaty to disregard the legal principles incorporated in the bilateral agreements and
to revert to self-help whenever they deem it necessary. FrontierJustice, Big Time, BosTON GLOBE, June 17, 1992, at 18 (stating that "[flor the rule of law, represented by
carefully negotiated extradition treaties designed to balance individual rights with
national interests, the court has foolishly substituted international vigilantism").
The Supreme Court's ruling reflects an illiberal approach to international law
and establishes a precedent that will negatively impact foreign relations. Linda Feldman, High Court Says U.S. Can Prosecute Mexican Doctor, CHRISTIAN SC. MoNrrOR, June

17, 1992 at 1. "The sad aspect of this ruling ... is that it shows that the Supreme
Court views international law as being 'out there,' and that it views the U.S. as not
being an integral part of the world - particularly at a time when the U.S. is touting
itself as an architect of a 'new world order' under which respect for law is vital." Id.
See contra The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding by U.S. Supreme Court
that international law is part of our law). Justice Stevens summed up the potential
impact of the majority's holding by declaring, "He that would make his own liberty
secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he
establishes a precedent that will reach to himself." Alvarez, 112 S. Ct. at 2206, quoting
2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (P. Foher ed. 1945).
Mexico's immediate response to the decision included a refusal to accept aid
from the United States to carry on its part of the drug war, and undoubtedly will
impede future relations. Mexico is Upset: Refusing U.S. Drug Aid Understandable,Regrettable, Editorial, Hous. CHRoN.,July 28, 1992, at A12. The greatest insult arising from

the Supreme Court holding rests with the decision rendered by U.S. District Judge
Edward Rafeedie, who on remand, dismissed the case against Dr. Alvarez-Machain
for lack of evidence. No End to the Mexican Kidnap Case, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1993, at 20. Judge Rafeedie found the evidence against Dr. Alvarez-Machain so

1992-1993]

IN RE EXTRADITION OF AL-JA WARY

1315

to support its departure from a tradition that has inhibited efforts to combat international terrorism in Italy. 295 Al-Jawary's

surrender by Italian authorities was vital to the United States
because the fugitive had been on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's most wanted list for eighteen years and his arrest in
Rome coincided with the outbreak of the Gulf War in Iraq. 96
As a result, the U.S. Justice Department worked feverishly to
obtain Al-Jawary's extradition to assure that the Italian courts
would not deny them the opportunity to prosecute the fugitive
for his offenses. 97 To accomplish its goal, the Justice Department introduced evidence of the treaty, as well as prior negotiations between U.S. and Italian representatives to refute AlJawary's defense that his extradition was barred by a literal interpretation of the treaty text.2 98 The Italian Court therefore
did not resort solely to the treaty language to address the issue
in Al-Jawary's extradition.299 If the Court of Cassation had
adopted a literal interpretation of the treaty, it would have dismissed the U.S. argument. Instead, the Court permitted the
U.S. government to submit evidence of the treaty negotiations
flimsy that it amounted to "the wildest speculation" and dismissed the case without
even requiring evidence from defense counsel. Man is Convicted in Dryg Agent's Torture
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at A18.
295. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Corte di Cassazione, Sezione
Pen. I/a, Sentence No. 767, at 15-17. Unlike the Italian Court of Cassation, the U.S.
Supreme Court ignored international law in Alvarez in order to circumvent United
States obligations under its treaty with Mexico. Alvarez, 112 S. Ct. 2188; Charles L.
Hobson, The Treaty was Not Violated, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992, at 15. "[T]he United
States-Mexico treaty makes kidnapping itself a crime for which extradition must be
granted unless the kidnapper is prosecuted domestically. There is no exception for
abductors who work on a federal stipend." Id.
296. REUTERS, supra note 194, at 5.

297. Author Internship with Senior Counsel for International Law Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Justice, Rome, Italy, Summer 1992.
298. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (discussing defense presented by
AI-Jawary's defense counsel). The United States counter-argued that prevailing jurisprudence governing application of the political offense doctrine to terrorist crimes
precluded AI-Jawary's act from being deemed a political offense. U.S. Memo, supra
note 71, at 1-2.
299. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Sez. Penale I/a, Sentence No.
767, at 1. In Alvarez, however, the United States argued that the treaty language was
determinative and the Supreme Court confined its decision to an analysis of the
treaty text. Alvarez, 112 S. Ct. at 2194 n. 11 "[T]he Government's argument is not
that the Treaty authorizes the abduction...b; ut that the Treaty does not prohibit the
abduction." (emphasis added). The contrasting approaches achieved different goals,
but they undermine the credibility of the arguments presented by the United States
government in each case.
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regarding the exclusion of terrorist acts from the political offense doctrine.3 0 0 By doing so, the Court of Cassation was
able to highlight the growing trend in international law to dif-

fuse the political offense provision.30 '
Ultimately, AI-Jawary signified an important new step towards strengthening cooperation with Italy.30 2 The development of U.S. legal relations with its allies should be of primary
interest if the United States is to achieve continued success in
the fight against narcotics traffickers and terrorists. 0 3 Inevitably, loopholes will exist as two nations try to implement an extradition treaty,3 0 4 but these defects can be remedied through
300. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Sez. Penale I/a, Sentence No.
767, at 1; U.S. Memo, supra note 71, at 4.
301. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (In re AI-Jawary), Sez. Penale I/a, Sentence No.
767, at 15-17.
302. But see Alvarez, 112 S. Ct. at 2188. Alvarez raises serious questions as to
whether the United States seeks to develop its legal relations with its allies or merely
preserve its interests without any regard for the consequences of its actions. See supra
note 294 and accompanying text (discussing various reactions to U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Alvarez).
303. Martin Address, supra note 3, at 539. "Circumvention of our treaties
reduces trust on the part of our allies and fosters the belief that the treaties themselves lack significance. I believe that the best interests of the United States lie in
developing its relations with its allies and strengthening its use of legal means, including extradition and mutual assistance." Id.
304. LAMBERT, supra note 5, at 249; see Antiterrorism Act of 1986, supra note 2,
at 34 (discussing inherent problems presented by probable cause, a concept unique
to U.S. legal system that is perplexing to most foreign law enforcement and judicial
authorities). The inherent problems have been evident in U.S.-Italian relations. Antiterrorism Act of 1986, supra note 2, at 34. The Italian judicial authorities have had
considerable difficulty understanding the justification for such a standard and realizing that an extradition request forwarded to the United States will not be granted
unless the U.S. Magistrate is provided with sufficient documentation to demonstrate
probable cause that 1) a crime has been committed; and 2) the individual sought has
committed the act for which he or she is requested. Turone, supra note 25, at 114.
Under Italian law, a less stringent standard of reasonable basis ("base ragionevole
per credere") is adopted. Id. at 115. Italian authorities continue to be frustrated
because Article 10, para. 3(b) of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, in order to facilitate extradition and bring the practice under the Treaty in line with European extradition practice, provides that with respect to persons charged with crimes in Italy,
Italy need only submit a summary of the relevant evidence to provide a reasonable
basis. Treaty Analysis, supra note 32, at 5. The term, however, was adopted only
because "probable cause" has no legal meaning in Italian jurisprudence, and the
change in terminology was not intended by U.S. authorities to change U.S. extradition practice requiring probable cause. Id. In an effort to reconcile the U.S. prerequisite for probable cause and identify and solve other problems presented both by
the U.S.-Italy MLAT and Extradition Treaties, the U.S. Department ofJustice and the
Italian Ministry of Grace and Justice conducted a series of consultations in Rome,
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continued cooperation and a greater effort towards under-

standing each nation's legal system.30 5 Bypassing legal channels and resorting to illegal methods of apprehension is risky
and ultimately undermines the sanctity of extradition treaties. 0 6
C. Al-Jawary and the Future of the Political Offense Doctrine in
U. S. -Italian Relations
The Court of Cassation's decision in AI-Jawary does not
foreclose the political offense controversy, but reflects a partial
solution to the conflict between Article 8 of the Penal Code
and Articles 10 and 26 of the Italian Constitution. 0 7 Stare decisis does not bind Italian courts.3 0 8 Future courts may thereItaly in the summer of 1992. Consultations Between the United States and Italy Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters (attended by Comment
Author June 5, 1992 and June 8, 1992). Additional limitations on the obligation to
extradite often incorporated in bilateral treaties include a prohibition of extradition
of a requested state's nationals, double criminality provisions (alleged offender can
be extradited only if the acts alleged constitute a crime in both countries), safeguards
against double jeopardy, and statute of limitations exceptions. MURPHY, supra note 5,
at 44. Though these limitations do not pose problems peculiar for extraditing terrorists, they demonstrate "why extradition often proves a cumbersome and time-consuming process for the rendition of international terrorists." Id.
305. Mario Pisani, Rapporti Giurisdizionali con Autoritd Straniere, in L'Indice Penale
398 (1984) (discussing how 1983 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983 replaced 1973
treaty between two nations). By obtaining a greater understanding of foreign legal
systems, the United States has been able to incorporate new principles and remedy
the defects of past extradition treaties. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 5, at 43 (describing U.S. abandonment of out-dated list approach in formation of new U.S.-Costa
Rica Extradition Treaty); Epps, supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting how
United States and Great Britain, following successful invocation of political offense
doctrine by several IRA members in United States, agreed to new supplementary
extradition treaty to virtually eliminate political offense exception).
306. Abramovsky, Catch and Snatch Policy, supra note 27, at 153. "[T]he
United States has a greater interest in preserving and enforcing treaties of extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters than it has in acquiring jurisdiction
over defendants by means of abduction." Id.
307. Merluzzi Interview, supra note 263.
308. See Marco Boschi, 11 Ruolo Della Corte di Cassazione, in 67 QUADERNI DELLA
GIUSTIZIA 40 (1987).
["E] preferibile il nostro sistema che, escludendo
un'applicazione automatica del principio stare decisis, consente positive evoluzioni giurisprudenziali volte ad evitare la cristallizzazione di interpretazioni normative superate da nuove realt socio-economiche" (Our [legal system] is preferable because by
excluding an automatic application of the principle of stare decisis, it permits the positive evolution of the law, thereby precluding the crystallization of normative interpretations that become replaced by new socio-economic realities) (translation by Comment Author). Id.
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fore depart from the approach set forth in Al-Jawary. The decision, however, sets an important precedent in Italian law. °9
The precedent, coupled with the Court's reliance on preceding
decisions rendered by the Court of Cassation in Gomez Ces and
Van Anraat, suggests that AI-Jawary will play a key role in future

decisions.3 1 0
AI-Jawary will assist U.S.-Italian efforts to combat terrorism. The decision rendered by the Court of Cassation presents
an approach quite different than that expressly provided in Article V of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty because the treaty

fails to address the issue of terrorist crimes.3 1 ' Amending the
treaty to account for the Court of Cassation's decision, however, would be difficult to accomplish.' 12 Furthermore, an
amendment would be impractical as it would only serve to confine future courts to follow a proscribed set of guidelines.3 13
Removing the political offense provision in its entirety does
not provide a satisfactory solution either, considering many
309. See Merluzzi Interview, supra note 263. As Dott. Merluzzi noted, the Court
granted AI-Jawary's extradition even though no one was injured in the attacks. Id.
Had people been injured, some may have argued that fact was a controlling factor.
Id. No one, however, was injured, thus reflecting how important the Court felt it was
to set down new law. Id. Setting new law is very uncommon for Italian courts and
the Court makes it clear that the political offense provision cannot be utilized by
terrorists to protect themselves from prosecution after having committed, or attempted to commit, terrorist acts against innocent civilians. Id.
310. Id. at 263.
311. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 98. As Murphy makes clear, "[tihe treaty ...
does not come to grips with the problem most relevant to the prosecution and punishment of international terrorists, namely the political offense exception." Id. "In
addition, "[n]owhere does the treaty provide for the exclusion of terrorist offenses
from the political offense category." Id.
312. See La Pergola, supra note 100, at 603 (discussing how constitutional
amendments are novelty in Italy). See Merluzzi Interview, supra note 263 (suggesting
treaty should be amended to get future courts to adhere to decision set forth in ,4Jawary and, more importantly, to serve as catalyst to European Community to recognize importance of decision). Id. According to Dr. Merluzzi, an amendment would
allow member states of the European Community to adopt the approach set forth in
Italy so that whenever an internal law and the State Constitution conflict, international conventions would control. Id.
313. See DOJ Interview, supra note 263. First, the political offense issue is not a
clear black and white issue, but one that must be assessed on a case by case basis. Id.
The United States argument presented to the Court of Cassation was directed towards getting Italy's highest court to understand that according to the U.S. interpretation of the treaty, terrorist acts are not protected by the political offense exception.
Id. Political offenses, as is evident from U.S. jurisprudence, must be assessed by balancing a totality of the circumstances in each case. Id.
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countries continue to oppress fundamental rights such as free
speech. 1 4
Despite the lack of potential methods to implement the
holding, the AI-Jawary decision signifies a continued decline in
the application of the political offense exception to terrorist
crimes, virtually eliminating any possibility that future terrorists who direct their acts against innocent civilians will escape prosecution. At the same time, the approach adopted by
the Court of Cassation permits the United States to confront
other members of the European Community with whom the
United States may need to negotiate treaties and persuade
them to heed the decision of the Italian Court in an effort to
develop a more uniform approach to the political offense doctrine in Europe. 1 Although the Court's decision to grant AlJawary's extradition could be attributed to various factors, 1 6
the case could not have been successful without the close co314. Id In certain countries, for example, defamation of the state is seen as a
crime, whereas in the United States such an act would be protected by the First
Amendment. Id. In these situations, particularly with the civil war currently being
waged in former Yugoslavia or the aftermath of the Tiannanmen Square incident in
China, the United States would not be willing to return an individual to a country
where they will be prosecuted for a "political crime." See CATELANI & STRIANI, supra
note 12, at 221 (discussing how removal of political offense exception would force
states to determine whether granting extradition request might-subject individual to
unfair trial). In such a scenario, denying a request could be interpreted by the requesting state as a negative assessment of its political regime, thereby straining relations between the two nations. Id.
315. See DOJ Interview, supra note 263, and accompanying text (discussing important role consistency plays in civil law countries).
316. See ETA Campaignfor Basque Independence has Killed Nearly 700, REUTERS, June
11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing how Spanish
Basque guerrilla movement ETA has renewed bomb attacks against Spanish targets
in Italy). The surge of ETA attacks made it apparent the terrorists were no longer
confining their activities to the Spanish mainland. Merluzzi Interview, supra note
263. The threat posed by these attacks may have played a significant role in the
Court's decision to make it clear that Italy, unlike France which has permitted numerous Red Brigade members to find refuge, would not become a safe haven for terrorists seeking to avoid extradition. Merluzzi Interview, supra note 263. Had the
Court denied the U.S. extradition request, Italy would have been inviting foreign
terrorists to come to Italy to escape prosecution. Id. More so, it would be ironic for
Italy to refuse to extradite a terrorist when Italy itself has been the target of some
poor decisions by foreign judicial authorities. See Martin Address, supra note 3, at
529-30. Finally, any effort by Minister Martelli to override the Court of Cassation's
decision would have raised serious concerns that Italy was not abiding to its obligations under the treaty and possibly straining relations between the two nations just as
the Achille Lauro Affair in 1985. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing
U.S. reaction to French court decision to deny U.S. extradition request).
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operation manifested between the Italian and U.S. governments.
Although stare decisis does not bind Italian courts, Al-Jawary
has, nonetheless, created important parameters for future
courts to abide by when deciding political offense cases. The
result in Al-Jawary illustrates how the use of established legal
channels can be an effective means of apprehending terrorists.
The Court's decision marks an important step towards
strengthening U.S.-Italian relations and will have a positive effect in combatting international terrorism. Ultimately, adhering to proper channels to handle extradition matters improves
cooperation and creates long-term benefits rather than the
short-term gains which result when nations choose to engage
in acts contrary to a treaty agreement.
CONCLUSION
The increase in ethnic clashes around the globe, coupled
with surging nationalism in countries seeking to establish their
position in the world, will cause more terrorist groups to
emerge and utilize terrorism to spread violence to attract attention.' 1 7 The political offense exception will play an important role in extraditing members of emerging terrorist groups,
but the lack of a uniform application of the doctrine will hinder
international efforts to combat terrorism. For this reason, the
United States must strengthen the channels of communication
currently available for apprehending terrorists and encourage
a uniform approach to the political offense doctrine in order to
assure that ruthless acts of violence aimed at innocent civilians
will no longer be exempt from extradition. Strengthening the
channels of communication designed to handle extradition
matters will allow foreign jurisdictions to reconcile any differences that they may have with the U.S legal system. More importantly, open communication will allow the United States to
317. See Steve Kerch, Terrorism Has Buildings on Alert, CM. TRI., Mar. 28, 1993, at
2L (discussing bombing of World Trade Center on Feb. 26, 1993); see also Robert D.
McFadden, 8 Seized as Suspects in Plot to Bomb New York Targets and Kill Political Figures,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1993, at Al (discussing arrest by Federal authorities of members of suspected terrorist organization that had plotted bombing and assassination
campaign in New York).
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cooperate more effectively with other nations and ultimately
lead to an increase in the successful prosecution of terrorists.
Santo F. Russo*
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Fordham University

